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Richard F. Devlin* We Can't Go On Together with 
Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias 
and Racialized Perspective in 
A. V. R.D.S. 
We recommend that the Chief Justices and Chief Judges of each 
court in Nova Scotia exercise leadership within his or her area of 
responsibility to ensure fair treatment of visible minorities in the 
criminal justice system. 
Marshall Report 1 
Perhaps. among some Whites, there is an inherent disquietude when 
they see that occasionally Blacks are adjudicating matters pertain­
ing to race relations, and perhaps that anxiety can be eliminated 
only hy having no Black judges sit on such matters or, if one cannot 
escape a Black judge, then by having the latter bend over backwards 
to the detriment of Black litigants and Black citizens and thus assure 
that brand of "impartiality" which some Whites think they deserve. 
- Higginbotham J.2 
Introduction 
In recent years it has been recognized that the Canadian judiciary has been 
drawn from only a relatively small cross section of the community, 
specifically privileged white males.3 As a result there have been calls for, 
and some action in pursuit of, appointment processes that are designed to 
• Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School, Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill 
University ( 1995-1996). I would like to thank Bruce Archibald. Carol Aylward, Vaughan 
Black, Tom Cromwell. Ian Fraser, Olivier Fuldauer, Burnley Jones, Archie Kaiser, Mary Jane 
Mossman. Chris Murphy. Dianne Pothier. Stephen Perrot, Rollie Thompson, Natalie Woodbury, 
Faye Woodman and an external reviewer, each of whom has contributed 10 the development 
of this comment. Needless to say, they do not necessarily agree with all the arguments. 
I. Commissioner'.r Report: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution 
(Halifax: The Commission, 1989) at 190 [hereinafter Marshall Report). 
2. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 546. 388 F. Supp. 155 at 177 (1974). 
3. C.B.A. The Appointment of ltul11es in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1985) 
al 9, 63; P. Russell and J. Ziegel, "Federal Judicial Appointments: An Appraisal of the First 
Mulroney Government's Appointments and the New Judicial Advisory Committees" ( I 99 I) 
41 U.T.L.J. 4 at 19. 33; C.B.A. Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, 
Touchstones for Cha11�e: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar 
Association. 1993) !hereinafter To11chsronesl. 
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diversify the bench in order to render it more inclusive.4 Gender and race 
are the two primary categories that are invoked as the benchmarks of 
diversity. 5 While it would appear that numerically there seems to be some 
very modest progress towards the goal of achieving a more inclusive 
judiciary,6 significant qualitative, institutional and ethical problems 
remain. This comment seeks to address two such problems. First, when 
we speak of i_ncreased "diversity" and greater "inclusion" what do we 
mean? Are candidates who are appointed to the bench, at least in part, on 
the basis of their race and gender, simply meant to reflect the pluralistic 
nature of Canadian society, or are they meant to represent the constitu­
ency from which they emanate? More concretely still, what do "reflect" 
or "represent" mean in the context of the judicial role in a contemporary 
democracy? Secondly, if it is accepted that racial or gender identity is an 
important variable in the appointment process, in what way should that 
identity manifest itself as a judge performs his/her duties on a daily basis? 
Specifically, should one's experiences as a person of colour and/or a 
woman inform the execution of one's judicial office? 
If one is tempted to agree that judges should (or inevitably do) reflect 
and represent their identity-based experiences, then one directly encoun­
ters a shibboleth of judicial office: the principle of impartiality. Conven­
tional wisdom holds that judges are to be free of all bias in their decision­
making processes and that if there is even a hint of prejudgment or 
partiality the integrity of the judicial system is imperilled: "The judge 
should be, and be seen to be, impartial and objective".7 Thus a judge who 
explicitly incorporates perspectives into his/her judicial method that may 
reflect the contexts that constitute his/her identity runs the risk of being 
accused of one of the most serious allegations of judicial impropriety: 
bias.8 
Unfortunately, this judicial "dilemma of difference''9 has not yet been 
adequately addressed in Canada. The debate seems to have stalled at the 
4. S. Manin & K. Mahoney. eds .. Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987); 
Ontario Law Refonn Commission, Appointing Judges: Philosophy, Politics and Practice 
(Toronto: Ontario Law Refonn Commission, 1991) (hereinafter Appoillling Judges); The 
Honourable M. Omatsu, "The Fiction of Judicial lmpaniality", fonhcoming ( 1996) C.J. W .L.; 
Courts of Justice Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994, S.O. 1994, c. 12, s. 49(2). 
5. Appointing Judges, ibid. 
6. Touchstones, supra note 3 at 50, 51. 
7. Judicial Code of Ethics, adopted pursuant to s. 261 of the Couns of Justice Act (R.S.Q., c. 
T-16) O.C. 643-82, 17 March 1982, G.P.Q. 1982 11 1253. 
8. R. v. Zundel (No 2.) (1990), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 16 I at 198 (Ont. C.A.), rev'd on other grounds 
( 1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.). 
9. M. Minow, Makin[!. All the Differena: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca: 
Cornett University Press, 1990) at I 2. 
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question of whether or not it is desirable to adopt policies that would 
promote greater judicial diversity . 10 But the fact is that some women and/ 
or people of colour who hold judicial office are already confronting this 
dilemma of difference and are paying a heavy toll. Consequently, this 
comment attempts to provide a preliminary examination of how this 
dilemma can arise, tentatively suggests a possible solution, and high­
lights ideological presumptions and institutionalized barriers that cir­
cumscribe the possibility of achieving anything more than tokenesque 
equality. The focus is on a recent Nova Scotian case, R. v. R.D.S. 
l. Facts and Record of R. v. R.D.S. 
On 2nd December 1994, Corrine Sparks-the only Black'' judge in Nova 
Scotia-presided over the trial of a Black youth, R.D.S. The charges 
against the youth arose out of an alleged altercation between him and a 
White police officer, as the latter was attempting to arrest another "non­
white"12 party who, as it turns out, was a cousin of R.D.S. 13 The police 
officer claimed that R.D.S. ran into him with a bicycle, pushed him and 
yelled at him. R.D.S. claimed that when he arrived on the scene, and asked 
his cousin what was going on, the police officer threatened to arrest him 
10. Appointing Judges, supra nole 4. 
I I . A commenl on terminology is essential. The issue of descriptors is fraught with difficulty. 
My own view is that while race (in the sense of skin colour) is an important prism of inquiry, 
racialization (in the sense of social and cultural forces lhat construct and encode interactions 
and iden1i1ies) is a more pertinent and problematic terrain of analysis. Consequently, I think that 
in the long term ii is more useful 10 develop descriptors based upon ethnic and cultural identity 
(e.g., Afro-Canadian) rather than pigmenlalion (e.g., Black). However, as the facts of this case 
specifically involve the latter discourse (especially the very curious "non-white") I will follow 
this precedent. The only variation is that pursuant to the Chicago Manual of Style, l will 
capitalize the terms Black and White when they refer to racialized groups. 
As to my own identity, I am White. What ensues is my interpretation of the significance 
of R. v. R.D.S. and.is in no way an attempt to speak on behalJ of Black communities, or to claim 
any particular expertise on issues of race. For a critique of an earlier partial foray on my part 
into issues of race in the context of legal education, see C. Aylward, "Adding Colour", 
forthcoming C.J.W.L. 
As a matter of ethics, it should also be noted that I have exchanged some of my thoughts 
with the defence lawyer, as this is a Dalhousie Legal Aid Service case. Also, Sparks J. has been 
a student in one of my courses as she is currently enrolled as an LL.M. candidate at Dalhousie 
Law School, and I co-ordinate the graduate seminar. 
12. According to the trial transcript, the police were in pursuit of what they described as 
several "non-white" youths who were believed to be involved in lhe lheft of a vehicle. 
I 3. On November I 0th, 1993, R.D.S. was charged with three counts under the Criminal 
Code: unlawful assault against a peace officer engaged in the execution of his duly, contrary 
10 s. 270( I )(a); unlawful assault againsl lhe same peace officer, with intent to prevent the peace 
officer from lawfully arresting N.R. (lhe·cousin of R.D.S.), conlrary to s. 270(1)(b); and 
unlawfully resisting the same peace officer who was engaged in the lawful execulion of his 
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and then put him in a choke hold. The youth denied striking the police 
officer. Apart from the police officer and the accused, no witnesses were 
called either by the Crown or the defence, thus everything turned on the 
credibility of the testimony of the police officer and R.D.S. At the end of 
the trial, which lasted about two hours, Judge Sparks delivered an oral 
decision acquitting the youth. The transcript of the decision reads as 
follows: 
In my view, in accepting the evidence, and I don't say that I accept 
everything that Mr. s·. has said in Court today, but certainly he has raised 
a doubt in my mind and, therefore, based upon the evidentiary burden, 
which is squarely placed upon the Crown, that they must prove all the 
elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, I have queries in my 
mind with respect to what actually transpired on the afternoon of October 
the l 7th. 14 
Had Sparks J. concluded her reasons at this point, R.D.S.#1 would 
probably15 have remained an uncontroversial case. However, she contin­
ued: 
The Crown says, well, why would the officer say that events occurred 
the way in which he has relayed them to the Court this morning. I'm not 
saying that the constable has misled the Court, although police officers 
have been known to do that in the past. And I'm not saying that the officer 
overreacted, but certainly police officers do overreact, particularly when 
they're dealing with non-white groups. Tfiat, to me, indicates a state of 
mind right there that is questionable. 
I believe that probably the situation in this particular case is the case of 
a young police officer who overreacted. And I do accept the evidence of 
Mr. S. that he was told to shut up or he would be under arrest. That seems 
to be in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the day . 16 
The police officer was disturbed by these statements and complained 
to his union and the police chief. 17 A local newspaper was contacted. The 
Halifax Chronicle Herald sought to get access to tapes of the transcript 
of the trial. However, on 16 December 1994, in a carefully crafted 
decision, 18 Sparks J. refused to grant access on the ground that this was 
14. R. v. R.D.S., Y093-168, (2 December 1994) at 68 (hereinafter R.D.S. II/]. 
15. I say ''probably" because conversations with one person who was in attendance at the trial 
suggest that both the police officer and the Crown lawyer did not appear to be comfortable with 
the unprecendently large number of Black court officials: the judge, the defence lawyer and the 
court reporter. 
16. R.D.S. #I, supra note 14 at 68-69. 
17. B. Dorey, "Cop Complains about Judges Remarks"The /Halifax/ Mail-Star(9 December 
1994) A3; 8. Dorey, "Paper Denied Access to Court Tape" The /Halifax/ Mail-Star (17 
December 1994) A3. 
18. R. v. R.D.S., F.H. No. Y093-168, Ruling Dec. 7th 1994 [hereinafter R.D.S.112]. 
r 
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a young offender case and that the transcript was protected under s. 38( I )  
of lhe Young Offenders Act. 19 
Two distinct notices of appeal were filed on 22 December, the last 
working day before the Christmas vacation. In the first, the Crown 
appealed on the basis that Judge Sparks' s decision manifested both actual 
and apparent bias in favour of the accused and against the police officer 
on the basis of their race. In the second, the Chronicle Herald newspaper 
and the C.B.C. argued that once the decision was rendered the transcript 
became part of the public record. Simultaneously, the Halifax Police 
Chief publicly complained about the raciafbias of Sparks J. and wrote a 
"letter of concern" to Chief Family Court Judge Ferguson.20 On 13 
January 1995 Judge Sparks filed supplementary reasons in support of her 
decision to acquit R.D.S.21 
The two appeals were heard in April 1995. Both were allowed.22 Chief 
Justice Glube dealt with the appeal on the issue of bias,23 and Palmeter 
A.CJ. dealt with the appeal on the issue of publicity.24 While there may 
be some debate as to the correctness of Palmeter J. 's decision, for the 
purposes of this comment I wish to focus on the decision of Chief Justice 
Glube. First, Glube C.J. held that the supplementary reasons issued by 
Judge Sparks on the 13th January 1995 were "gratuitous". Specifically, 
she pointed out that Sparks J. made comments on "the demeanour of the 
police officer which were not contained in the original decision" and 
made "a specific reference to outside material which was not contained 
in the original decision."25 These materials were the Marshall Report. 
Consequently, Glube CJ. refused to consider the supplementary reasons. 
Secondly, Glube C.J. directly addressed the issue of bias. Having very 
briefly invoked one precedent on bias,26 she opined that "[f]undamental 
justice requires impartial decision-makers, and includes natural justice 
and a duty to act fairly".27 Several lines later she continued: 
19. R.S.C. 1985, c. Y- 1 .  
20. E. Hoare & B. Dorey, "Top Cop Considers Action Against Judge", The [Halifax/ Mail 
Star ( IO December 1 994) A4; E. Hoare, "Halifax Police Chief to Complain about remarks from 
Judge", The [Halifax] ChronicleHerald ( l3 December l994) A 7; B. Dorey, "Matter of Judge's 
Remarks Dropped" The I Halifax] Mail-Star (9 May 1995) A 7. 
2 1 .  F.H. No. 8093- 168, Supplementary Reasons [hereinafter R.D.S. #3). 
22. It is to be noted. for the sake of completeness, that once the two appeals were successful, 
the police chief withdrew the threat of filing a complaint. 
23. R. v. R.D.S.. S.C.N.S. SH # 1 1 2402 ( 1 8  April 1 995) [hereinafter R.D.S. #4). 
24. R. v. R.D.S. (re Halifax Herald Ltd.). [ 1995) N.S.J. 207 (S.C.). 
25. R.D.S. #4, supra note 23 at 4-5. 
26. Pearlman v. Manitoba l.Aw Society, [ 199 1 )  2 S.C.R. 869. This is a curious precedent as 
ii deals wilh an allegation, in an administrative context, of financial interest. 
27. R.D.S. 114, supra note 23 at 8 .  
r 
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There is certainly nothing in the transcript of the actual evidence which 
was heard on December 2nd to suggest any bias or apprehension of bias, 
but when I tum to the decision rendered the same day . . .  it contains a 
thorough review of the facts and a finding based upon credibility in favour 
of the accused. Had the decision ended there . . .  [ where Sparks J. addresses 
the question of the evidentiary burden] there would have been no basis for 
this appeal as the Crown has already conceded. Unfortunately, the decision 
did not. The Learned Trial Judge went on to add two more paragraphs  . . . .  
[ cited previously] 
On a thorough review of the transcript, I find no basis for these ,remarks 
in the evidence. There was no evidence before the trial court as to the 
"prevalent attitude of the day" or otherwise the remarks made relating to 
the police. With great respect, judges must be extremely careful to avoid 
expressing views which do not form part of the evidence. 
The test of apprehension of bias is an objective one, that is, whether a 
reasonable right-minded person with knowledge of all the facts would 
conclude that the judge' s  impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In 
my respectful opinion, in spite of the thorough review of the facts and the 
finding on credibility, the two paragraphs at the end of the decision lead to 
the conclusion that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists. 
Having found that, I need go no further as such a finding requires that 
a new trial be ordered . . . .  
In conclusion, the appeal is allowed and a new trial is ordered in front 
of a different trial judge. 28 
The decisions rendered by Sparks J. and Glube CJ. raise several 
important questions which bring the dilemtna of difference in the judicial 
context into sharp relief. What exactly did Youth Court Judge Sparks and 
Glube CJ. say? What is the nature and scope of the law on judicial bias? 
Specifically, in the context of the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test, 
what, precisely, is the appropriate test to apply and who is the prototypical 
reasonable person? Are there any precedents for finding judicial bias on 
the basis of race, and if not might it be the case that Judge Sparks has been 
subjected to a double standard? Could it be argued that Sparks J. 's 
comments on police officers misleading the court was simply an express 
rejection of a presumption of police infallibility, and that her comments 
on police officers' negative attitudes towards Black youth were simply 
the manifestation of a contextual judicial method? More broadly, what 
exactly do we mean by bias, impartiality and fairness in the context of 
judicial decision-making and what are the attributes of good judging in 
contemporary society? Closely related is the question of whether judges 
should be "colourblind" or whether they have the responsibility to factor 
in social variables such as race where appropriate. Finally, there is the 
issue of the possible impact of this decision on: (a) the accused; (b) the 
28. Ibid. at 8-10. 
I 
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Black community; ( c) the judicial community, and ( d) Judge Sparks. The 
remaining sections of this comment address each of these questions. 
II. What Was Said? 
Before proceeding with a substantive analysis of the decisions in this 
case, it should be noted that neither judge was as clear as she might have 
been in giving her reasons. Fairness therefore requires that I identify 
ambiguities that pervade the reasoning of both Sparks J. and Glube CJ. 
and that I be explicit about my interpretation of their statements. 
Trial judges have a heavy workload that allows little time f�r meticu­
lously thought-through reasoning. This is particularly true when deci­
sions are delivered orally immediately after counsel have finished their 
arguments. Judge Sparks's decision, unfortunately, has some ambigu­
ities and apparent contradictions that need to be resolved. When we 
analyze the two paragraphs in question, there is little problem with her 
statements on the ultimate burden of proof: the Crown failed to prove its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt. 29 The next paragraph does, however, 
cause some problems. In response to the Crown's proposition that there 
could be no conceivable reason for the police officer to say anything at 
variance with the truth of what happened, as I read Judge Sparks, she 
makes two points. First, she appears to be suggesting that there should be 
no automatic judicial assumption as to the accuracy of a police officer's 
interpretation of events, because sometimes officers (like any other group 
of witnesses) may mislead the court. She is careful to add, however, that 
she is not claiming that this particular officer misled the court.30 I 
understand her use of ''mislead" to be in the sense of deliberate misrep­
resentation, which is different from saying that the officer 's  account may 
reflect his own good-faith, but necessarily subjective, interpretation of 
events. Second, Sparks J. points out that police officers cannot be 
presumed to be absolutely virtuous, for sometimes they overreact in 
moments of stress, and that this can happen particularly when they are 
dealing with "non-white" groups.3 1  She does add, however, that she is not 
saying that the particular officer in this case overreacted on the basis of 
race. 32 As I shall suggest in Part V, neither of these propositions can be 
seriously questioned. 
29. R.D.S. #I. supra note 14 al 68. I attach the qualifier "little" because an argument could 
he made that, as phrased, Judge Sparks's comments may confuse the "legal burden" with the 
"evidential burden". For an overview of this distinction see J. Sopinka, The Law of El'idence 
in Canada (Toronto: Bu1terworths, 1992) c. 3. 
30. /hid. 
3 1 .  /hid. al 68-69. 
32. /hid. at 69. 
r 
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Slightly more problematic is the next sentence-"That, to me, indi­
cates a state of mind right there that is questionable. "33-because it is not 
clear what the "that" refers to, nor what she means by "a state of mind". 
As I read this sentence, it only makes sense in the context of the Crown 's 
contention that there could be no possible reason why the police officer 
would misrepresent the situation. Judge Sparks's point appears to be that 
in a racially stratified society there are indications that police officers are 
not always credible or neutral, and that this reality is part of a background 
knowledge that a judge should not ignore. 
The next sentence continues to complicate the picture because, in 
apparent contradiction to what she had said three lines previously, Judge 
Sparks explicitly states that "probably . . .  [the] young police officer . . .  
overreacted. "34 She supports this determination of fact by expressly 
accepting the evidence of the accused that "he was told to shut up or he 
would be under arrest."35 However, the following statement-"that 
seems to be in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the day. "36-may be 
unclear. Once again the antecedent to which the "that" refers is ambigu­
ous: it could mean that Judge Sparks believes that most people would 
believe that a police officer might tell a Black youth to shut up or face 
arrest; or, it could mean that the police officer's aggressive response to 
R.D.S. was an articulation of a common racially prejudiced attitude in 
Canada towards Black youths. Either way, the comment seems to suggest 
that police officers may be racially influenced in their attitudes towards, 
and conduct in relation to, "non-whites". 
To summarize, as I interpret her decision Judge Sparks seems to have 
said two things: first, that sometimes police officers may mislead the 
court, and secondly, that sometimes White police officers are racially 
influenced in their interactions with Black citizens. 
Glube C.J.'s appeal decision was also delivered orally. Like Sparks 
J. 's decision, it is inelegant, and somewhat unclear at certain key points. 
This is unfortunate given the importance of the issues. In particular, one 
sentence needs to be highlighted-"There is no evidence before the trial 
court _as to 'the prevalent attitude of the day' or otherwise the remarks 
relating to the police."37-because, though crucial, it is ambiguous. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. My colleague. Professor Pothier. has suggested that the statements may not be quite 
as contradictory as I suggest. She argues that in the first reference, Sparks J. is indicating that 
she cannot say for sure that the pol ice officer overreacted, and that in the second reference she 
is simply indicating that he probably did. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
37. R.D.S. #4, supra note 23 al 10. 
...; 
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Clearly the gist of the claim is that because no evidence was tendered at 
trial about prevalent attitudes or public opinion then a judge should not 
conjecture as to those matters. This, as we shall see in Part V, is debatable. 
But the point of Glube C.J. 's "or otherwise the remarks" reference is 
unclear. My sense is that Glube CJ. is referring to Judge Sparks's 
suggestion that police officers may overreact when dealing with "non­
white" groups. Glube CJ. 's purpose, I think, is to indicate that the judicial 
articulation of such a viewpoint gives rise to a reasonable apprehension 
of bias because the judge can be perceived as either being hostile to 
(White) police officers, or favouring of "non-whites", or both. For Glube 
CJ. this is enough. Consequently, no further analysis is required and the 
only remedy is to order a new trial. 
To be clear, although Glube CJ. never explicitly states that her finding 
of an apprehension of bias is related to race there can be little doubt that 
this is the case. Racial bias, both actual and apparent, was vigorously 
argued by the Crown lawyer and Glube CJ. 's own decision, as we have 
seen, primarily focussed on Sparks J. 's remarks which clearly factored in 
the issue of race. 
Having attempted to clarify what was said by both Judge Sparks and 
Chief Justice Glube, I can now provide an interpretation of the signifi­
cance of these statements. As a preliminary step it will be helpful to locate 
this case in the context of the common law of judicial bias. 
III . The Law of Judicial Bias 
The law of judicial bias in Canada is both indeterminate and underdevel­
oped. For the purpose of this comment several points may be worth 
noting. First, conventionally there are said to be two possible grounds for 
a claim of judicial bias: (a) real or actual bias; or (b) situations giving rise 
to "a reasonable apprehension of bias".38 Second, a determination of 
whether actual or apprehended bias exists will depend upon the facts of 
each case. 39 Third, actual bias is very rarely argued40 and almost never 
succeeds, therefore the vast majority of cases deal with the issue of 
"reasonable apprehension of bias".41 
38. R.M. Sedge wick Jr., "Disqualification on the Ground of Bias as Applied to Administra­
tive Tribunals'" ( 1945) 23 Can. Bar Rev. 453. 
39. Pearlman, supra note 26 at 88_5; Ruffo v. Counseil de la Magistrature (1 992), 98 D.L.R. 
( 4th) 176 at 1 82 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal granted 4 February 1993, { 1993 J I S.C.R. ix. 
40. But see R. v. Zundel (No. 2). s11pra note 8. 
4 1 .  See e.g. R. v. Bertram. I 19891 O.J. No. 2123 (H.C.J.) (QL); R. v. lacombe, [ 1986) O.J. 
No. 328 (S.C.) (QL). 
r 
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Fourth, concerns about an apprehension of bias are fairly common in 
the criminal trial context.42 Usually, they are expressed as concerns about 
a judge's negative attitude or conduct in relation to an accused.43 Occa­
sionally, they are raised in the context of a judge's comments on the 
performance of the accused's counsel,44 and infrequently on the basis of 
a judge's relationship with the Crown.45 Moreover, and importantly for 
the purposes of this case, it should be noted that only very rarely does the 
Crown claim an apprehension of judicial bias.46 
Fifth, although the rhetoric of the case law appears to put a very high 
premium on justice "manifestly be[ing] seen to be done",47 a comprehen­
sive analysis of the case law suggests that in the vast majority of the cases 
concerns about an apprehension of bias are dismissed. This can be 
explained because: 
a) there is a "presumption of regularity", based on the maxim omnia 
praesumuntur rite esse acta;48 
b) there is an implicit counterprinciple that assumes good faith and 
impartiality on the part of judges,49 sometimes giving rise to a 
perception that there is a "duty to sit";50 
c) a suggestion of actual or reasonable apprehension of bias is 
frequently not well received by either the judge in question or the 
42. See e.g. R. v. Brouillard, (1985] l S.C.R. 39. 
43. R. v. Gerlach, {1994) OJ. No. 1236(Gen. Div.) (QL); R. v. Lacombe, [ 1986] OJ. No. 328 
(S.C.) (QL).; R. v. Ord Exparte Churly, (1971) I O.R. 641 (H.CJ.); R. v. R.A.B. (1990). 67 
Man. R. (2d) 258 (C.A.); R. v. Teskey, ( 1995) 28 Alta. L.R. (3d) 196 (Q.B.). 
44. R. v. Stark, [1994) OJ. No. 406 (Gen. Div.) (QL); R. v. Maxemiuk ( 1994), 122 Sask. R. 
223 (Q.B.). 
45. R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) I (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Smith and Whiteway 
Fisheries (1994), 133 N.S.R. (2d) 50 (C.A.). 
46. See e.g. R. v. Gushman, (1994) OJ. No. 813 (Gen. Div.) (QL); Re Ramsey (1972), 8 
C.C.C. (2d) 188 (N.B.C.A.). 
41. R. v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy, [ 1923) All E.R. Rep. 233 at 234 (C.A.). 
48. G.W.l. Properties v. Grace, [ 1992] 8.C.J. No. 2828 at para. 13 (C.A.) (QL); R. v. 
Osachuk (1995), 127 Sask. R. 21 at 33 (Q.8.). See also Re E.A. Manning Ltd. and Ontario 
Securities Commission, [ 1995] 23 O.R. (3d) 257 at 267 (C.A.). 
49. As phrased by Blackstone, "The law will not suppose a possibility of bias in a judge, who 
is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that 
presumption and idea." W. Blackstone, Commentaries On the Laws of England Ill (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1788) at 361. See also R. v. Lippe ( 1991), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 513 at 540; Ruffo, supra 
note 39 at 202; LeB/anc v. LeBlanc: ( 1993), 85 Man. R. (2d) 278 (C.A.); Phillips v. Nova Scotia 
(Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), ( 1995) 2 S.C.R. 97. 
50. R. v. Holmes, ( 1989) M.J. No. 413 (Prov. Ct.) (QL); Middlekamp v. Fraser Valley Real 
Estate Board, [ 1993) B.C.J. No. 2965 at para. 26 (S.C.) (QL); R. v. Zborovsky, ( 1992) O.J. No. 
1861 (Prov. Div.) (QL). 
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appellate court,5 1  and therefore, lawyers are cautious of advancing 
such an argument;52 
d) the burden of proof is upon the party alleging either actual or 
reasonable apprehension of bias;53 
e) the standard of proof upon the party alleging a reasonable appre­
hension of bias is, in reality, quite high. 54 
This last point on the issue of the standard of proof merits further 
elaboration. It is widely acknowledged that the test for detennining 
whether there is a reasonable apprehension.of bias is an "objective" one, 
that is, it is not whether a judge subjectively would believe that his/her 
conduct or words might be biased, but whether a reasonable person would 
find these to be indicative of a probable bias.55 The c.ase law in Canada 
almost always invokes the standard outlined by de Grandpre J. (dissent­
ing) in the administrative law case of Committee for Justice v. National 
Energy Board: 
the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and· 
right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining 
thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that 
test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically 
and practically-and having thought the matterthrough--<:onclude. Would 
he think that it is more likely than not that Mr. Crowe, whether consciously 
or unconsciously, would not decide fairly."56 
For the purposes of this comment two points are worth noting about this 
test: the attributes and identity of the "reasonable person", and whether 
that person's perception of bias rests upon a possibility or probability test. 
Although central to much common law legal thought,57 the reasonable 
person test is problematic. While the case law tells us that s/he should be 
infonned, thoughtful and right minded, in the end the reasonable person 
5 1 .  R. v. Zundel (No. 2), supra note 8 at 207; R. v. Mohan (1994), 162 A.R. 6 (C.A.); G.W.L. 
Properties, supra note 48 al paras. 13, 18; R. v. Stark. [1994] OJ. No. 406 at para. 25 (Gen. 
Div.) (QL). 
52. R. v. T. (R.T J.), [ 19891 N.S.J. No. 223 (S.C.) (QL), Nathanson J. 
53. "Bias, however, is easily alleged by a disgruntled litigant. The successful party has rights 
too. A decision cannot be oven urned merely because one party apprehends bias. The facts must 
also show that pany's apprehension 10 be reasonable." Leblanc v. Leblanc, supra note 49. 
54. For example, in Ruffo, neither passion, vigour nor even aggressiveness were considered 
10 generate concerns about a reasonable apprehension of bias. "Obvious hostility" appeared to 
be the benchmark. Supra note 39 at 196-97. 
55. Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) v. I.Annon, [ 1969) I Q.B. 577 at 599 (C.A.), 
Denning M.R. 
56. l 19781 I S.C.R. 370 al 394. 
57. Its origins can be traced 10 VauKhan v. Menlove ( 1837), 3 Bing. N.C. 467, 132 E.R. 490 
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is a fictional abstraction.58 Throughout the case law on judicial bias the 
reasonable person is assumed to be without age, gender, or race. But this 
universal figure is like no one we know or can recognize. Increasingly, in 
other common law doctrines the courts are beginning to recognize this 
reality and are slowly beginning to locate the reasonable person in the 
experiential contexts from which we all inevitably emerge. For example, 
in relation to.the defence of provocation, both the Supreme Court and the 
House of Lords have acknowledged that age is an important element in 
setting the standard for a "reasonable person" where the accused is a boy 
in his mid-teens who killed an older man who had sexually assaulted 
him. 59 Indeed, in various dicta, Lord Diplock has suggested that gender 
and race might also be pertinent variables, though he did not develop the 
point.ro Moreover, in the last decade many women scholars have pointed 
out that in effect we have had the reasonable man test and that it implicitly 
relies upon male experiences and perceptions.61 Most significantly, in the 
case of R. v. Lavallee,62 the Supreme Court of Canada accepted such an 
analysis in the context of the law of self defence and acknowledged that 
the reasonable woman is not necessarily in the same situation as the 
reasonable man and that the law should acknowledge these existential 
and experiential differences.63 
If we recognize that the reasonable person test is cognizant of age and 
gender differences, might it also be possible for it to be responsive to 
racialized difference? In other words, historically has the reasonable 
person-"the man on the Clapham omnibus"64-been implicitly "White"; 
58. Y.M. Morrisette, "The Exclusion of Evidence under the Canadian Charter of Ri1:hrs and 
Freedoms: What to Do and Whal Not to Do" ( 1984) 29 McGill L.J. 523 at 538. 
59. R. v. Hill (1986), 5 1  C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.); D.P.P. v. Camp/in, (1978] 2 All E.R. 127 
(H.L.). 
60. Camp/in, ibid. al 174. 
6 1 .  Sec, for example. H. Allen, "One Law for All Reasonable Persons?" (1988) 16 Int ' I  J. Soc. 
L. 419; N. Ehrenreich, "Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness 
in Sexual Harassment Law" (1990) 99 Yale L.J. 1177; L. Finley, "A Break in the Silence: 
Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course" (1989) I Yale J.L. & Fem. 41; C. Forell, 
"Essenlialism, Empathy and the Reasonable Woman" (1994) U. 1 1. L. Rev. 771; C. Sanger, 
"The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man" (1992) 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 141 I .  
62. (1990] 4 W.W.R. I .  
63. See also Egan v. Canada (1995), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609 at 633, 676-77 (S.C.C.) Cory and 
L'Heureux-Dube JJ., dissenting on other grounds. It might be argued that this contextualist 
approach to the reasonable person test has been qualified by R. v. Crei1:hton ( 1993), 23 C.R. 
(4th) 189 (S.C.C.) by a slim 5-4 majority. However, the significance of this case for 
determining the characteristics of the reasonable person, and in particular Lavallee. supra 
note 62, has been subject to quite contradictory academic interpretations. See, for example, 
"Criminal Reports Forum: Objective Fault in the Supreme Court" (1993), 23 C.R. (4th) 
240-79. 
64. Hall v. Brook/ands Club ( 1933), 1 K.B. 205 al 224. 
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' 
and has the time now come for Canadian law to recognize not just the 
multicultural but also the racialized nature of Canadian society? Thus I 
would suggest that while the reasonable person test is still a useful legal 
device in that it is not desirable to retreat to hypersensitive subjectivity, 
on occasion it will be necessary to consider whether race may be a 
relevant variable in determining the reasonableness of that person's 
perception.65 And, in my opinion, R.D.S. is one such case. Specifically, 
when a judge suggests that racial identity may influen�e relations 
between a White police officer and a Black youth, is the person who might 
apprehend a possible bias assumed to be a person of colour or White?66 
Might it be that while we are all members of Canadian society, we see that 
society in racially informed ways, and that what may appear to be bias to 
one person may in fact appear to be an incontrovertible reality to another? 
I will return to the issue of different perceptions of police-Blad� relations 
in Part V. My only point here is that bias may be in the eye of the beholder, 
and that if (as the House of Lords has acknowledged) the reasonable 
person is but the Court 's "anthropomorphic conception of justice•'67 then 
65. See also, D. Greene, "Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and the 
Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida" ( 1 993) 67 Tulane L. Rev. 1979 at 2038-
43; R. Ward, "Consenting to Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighbourhoods: No 
Place for a 'Reasonable Person"' ( 1993) 36 Howard L.J. 239. 
66. This proposal lo further contextualize the reasonable person is not unprecedented. For 
example. in 1956 the Supreme Court of the Northern Territories of Australia rejected an 
argument that the reasonable person standard was different for White persons and Aboriginal 
persons. but it did permit the jury to consider evidence on what a reasonable person who had 
experienced the world as an Aboriginal would have concluded: 
lT)he general principle of law is to create a standard which would be observed by the 
average person in the community in which the accused person lives. It is clear from the 
cases decided . . .  that in White communities . . .  the standard is not a fixed and 
unchanging standard; it leaves it open . . .  to regard the . . .  tribe as separate community 
for purposes of considering the reaction of the average man . . .  [i)f . . .  the average 
reasonable person in his community [would have so reacted). 
R. v. M uddaruhha ( 1956 ), N .T.J. 317 at 322. Moreover, in the American Supreme Court at least 
two cases have acknowledged that race may be a relevant variable where considering "police­
rninority relations". See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ( 1968) and U.S. v. Mendentall, 446 U.S. 544 
at 558 ( 1980). U.S. Reh. Den. 448 U.S. 908. Moreover, in the context of hostile environment 
litiga1ion at least two U.S. courts have accepted that the appropriate perspectival standard is that 
of a "reasonable Black person" when addressing harassment against a Black male, or "the 
reasonable person of the same gender and race or color" when dealing with harassment against 
a Black female. See Harris v. International Paper, 765 F. Supp. 1509 at 15 16  ( 1991) and 
Stinf?ley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424 at 428-29 ( 1 992). 
67. Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, ( 1956) A.C. 696 at 728 
(H.L.) Lord Radcliffe. See also R. v. Gough, 11992) 2 All E.R. 724 at 735 (H.L.); Glasgow 
Corporation v. Muir, [ 19431 A.C. 48 at 457, Lord MacMillan; Froom v. Butcher, 1 1975) 3 All 
E.R. 520 at 526--526 (C.A.), Lord Denning M.R.; and R. v. Collins (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) I 
at 18  (S.C.C.), where Lamer J. (as he then was) grudgingly acknowledged the necessary 
subjectivity of the reasonable person. 
( 
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it may be appropriate to inquire into the racial identity and experiential 
context of the judge who finds that there is a reasonable apprehension of 
bias based on race.68 
Even when we recognize that the reasonable person is really the 
judge's jurisprudential alter ego, there still remains another aspect of the 
test, that is, the issue of the intensity of this person's apprehension of bias. 
As Watt J. has recently argued: 
Fundamental to the test applied in cases where a reasonable apprehen­
sion of bias is alleged are two objective standards or elements. A standard. 
of reasonableness is applied, not only to the observer, but also to what is 
observed. The observer, the person by whom bias must be apprehended, 
must be a reasonable person whom the law invests with knowledge of the 
circumstances which are said to give rise to the apprehension of bias. 
Further, the apprehension of bias must itself be reasonable from what is 
observed. In other words, it must be a reasonable apprehension, not one 
which is fanciful, imaginary, illusory or conjectural.69 
However, reasonable apprehension, like the reasonable person, is a rather 
indeterminate standard and the case Jaw suggests two possible variations: 
a "possibility" and a "probability" test for bias. 
A possibility test establishes a relatively low threshold for finding an 
apprehension of bias. Its clearest articulation is to be found in R. v. Sussex 
Justices when Lord Hewett postulated that 0the rule is that nothing is to 
be done which so much as creates even a Suspicion that there has been an 
improper interference with the course· of justice."70 In essence, this 
"suspicious mind" test asks whether a reasonable person might appre­
hend bias.71 Consequently, it has the potential to cover a wide range of 
judicial conduct. 
However, another.line of cases invokes a higher threshold and adopts 
a probability test: would a reasonable person apprehend a real likelihood 
of bias? In the English context this probability or real likelihood test can 
be traced back to R. v. Rand,72 and was explicitly preferred over the looser 
possibility test in the carefully reasoned decision of R. v. Cambourne 
68. In a recent report prepared for the Canadian Judicial Council, Professor Friedland has 
argued that a judge has "enonnous discretion . . .  in using the test of whether a reasonable well­
informed observer would have an apprehension of bias . . . .  The reasonable, well-informed 
person seems to be the judge deciding the case." M. Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial 
Independence and Accountahility in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1995) at 18. 
69. R. v. Gushman, supra note 46 at para. 31 [emphasis added). 
70. [ 1924] I K.B. 256 at 258. Similar dicta are to be found in R. v. Essex Justices. I 1927] 2 
K.B. 475 and R. v. Campbell (1981 ), 49 N.S.R. (2d) 307 at 317-18 (C.A.). 
71. Hon. R. Kimball, "Judicial Misbehaviour and R. v. Sussex Justices" ( 1994) 1 8(1) Prov. 
Judges J. 11. 
72. [ 1866) L.R. I Q.B. 230 at 233. 
/ ) 
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Justices ex pa rte Pearce.73 Indeed in one of the most oft-cited precedents 
ii:i this area, Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.C.G.) v. Lannon,74 Lord 
Denning opined: 
there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is 
not enough . . . .  There must be circumstances from which a reasonable 
man would think it likely or probable that the justice or chairman as the 
case may be would or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the 
other. 
Finally, in England this debate has been resolved by a recent decision of 
the House of Lords, which has, after an extensive review of the two 
competing lines of authority, determined that the appropriate test is that 
of a "real danger".75 
Similarly, in the Canadian context, in Committee for Justice, de 
Grandpre J. has argued that "[t]he grounds for this apprehension must . . .  
be substantial" and explicitly rejected the standard of a "very sensitive or 
scrupulous conscience". 76 He was joined by Laskin C.J. who also rejected 
the standard of "an uneasy suspicion".77 Moreover, in a very recent and 
quite thorough review of the pertinent case law, Nash J., of the Alberta 
Queen's Bench, extracted the following principle: "(t]he test is whether 
there exists a real likelihood of bias-mere suspicion is not enough."78 
However, despite the fact that the dominant trend · is in favour of a 
probability test for the apprehension, as I will argue in the next section, 
Glube C.J. seems to adopt a possibility threshold. 
IV. Case Law on Racial Bias: A Double Standard? 
In light of the foregoing comments, it is important to note that in a review 
of case law on judicial bias in Canada, I have not turned up one decision 
where there has been found to be racially grounded judicial bias, either 
real or apprehended. Two explanations may be offered. First, it could be 
suggested that in the several hundred years that White people have been 
in what is now called Canada, judges have been extremely sensitive to 
issues of racial inequality and that, unlike many Canadians, they have 
risen above racial prejudice. Alternatively, it might be argued that "non­
white" groups have been either so subordinated to, or marginalized from, 
73. 11954) 2 All. E.R. 850 at 855 (Q.B.). 
74. 11968) 3 All. E.R. 304 at 310 (C.A.). 
75. R. v. Gough, supra note 67. 
76. Committee for Justice, supra note 56 at 395. 
77. Ibid. at 386 concurring with dicta from the Federal Court of Appeal. 
78. R. v. Teskey, 11995] A.J. No. 142 (Q.8.) (Q.L.). See alsoR. v. Bain ( 1992), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 
481 (S.C.C.); Adams v. Workers Compensation Board ( 1989), 42 8.C.L.R. (2d) 228 (C.A.); 
G.W.L. Properties. supra note 48 at para. 13; R. v. Walker, 1 1968) 3 C.C.C. 254 (Alta. C.A.). 
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the Canadian legal system that it has been unreceptive to their experi­
ences, perceptions, concerns or complaints. In other words, the issue of 
race has been a non-question in the law of judicial bias.79 Given the 
findings of several recent commissions80 it would appear that the former 
explanation is indefensible and, therefore, I would suggest that the latter 
is the more likely explanation. But no matter which of these two 
explanations is adopted, surely it is significant that the first Canadian case 
where there is a finding of an apprehension of racial bias is in relation to 
statements made by a Black judge. 
By way of comparison, it may be fruitful to briefly consider two recent 
situations where racial bias was alleged, but not found. The first stems 
from the Donald Marshall Jr. saga. The second involved Territorial Court 
Judge R.M. Bourassa of the Northwest Territories. 81 After the publication 
of the Marshall Report82 the Attorney General of Nova Scotia requested 
the Canadian Judicial Council to hold an inquiry into the conduct of the 
Reference Court and to consider whether there were grounds to remove 
the five appellate judges from office. Even though members of the Court 
of Appeal seemed to be quite hostile to Mr. Marshall and had stated that 
"any miscarriage of justice was more apparent than real"83 the Inquiry, 
while critical of"the grossly inappropriate language",84 ultimately deter­
mined that such statements did not impugn the impartiality of the court. 85 
An equally high threshold for a finding of bias has been applied in the 
Bourassa Inquiry. 
Bourassa J. was widely criticized for both racism and sexism because 
of certain statements he allegedly made during an interview, and because 
79. J. McCalla.Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile" in A. Miles & A. Finn, Feminism 
in Canada: From Pressure to Politics (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982) at 27. 
80. See e.g. S. Lcwis,Letter to Bob Rae, Premier of Ontario, Outlining the Recommendations 
to Improve Race Relations in Ontario (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 1992); Cawsey 
Report,] ustice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact 
on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta (Edmonton: Task Force, 1991); Marshall Report, 
supra note I. 
8 1. There is one other case where a judge's decision was appealed because of negative 
comments he made in the context of a case involving Pakistani immigrants. The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal found, however, that the comments would not generate an 
apprehension of bias. Pirbhai Estate v. Pirbhai ( 1988), 70 C.B.R.(N.S.) 175 (B.C.S.C.). 
82. Supra note l .  
83. R. v. Marshall ( 1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 286 at 287 (C.A.). 
84. "Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Inquiry Committee Established Pursuant 
to subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia" 
( 1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 2 IO  at 220. 
85. Ibid. at 222. It might be worth noting that the Inquiry was extremely deferential to several 
other �tatements made by the Court of Appeal justices in relation to Mr. Marshall arguing I hat 
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of a sentence he imposed in a sexual assault case (R. v. A.86) which, some 
argued, was egregiously low because the accused was a prominent 
member of the community. I will briefly review the findings of a judicial 
inquiry constituted to determine whether Judge Bourassa should be 
dismissed because of unfitness and misbehaviour and the Appeal Court 
decision in the sentencing case. My purpose is to identify how the issue 
of bias has been dealt with in these contexts in order to inquire whether 
a different (double) standard has been applied to Judge Sparks. 
The judicial inquiry came about because of several comments alleged 
to have been made by Judge Bourassa in an interview with a journalist. 
The comments suggested: (a) he believed that the degree of violence in 
sexual assault cases in northern communities was less than in southern 
communities; (b) he considered that rapes in the North tended to occur 
�'when the woman is drunk and passed out [and a] man comes along and 
sees a pair of hips and helps himself';87 ( c) he caricatured women who had 
been sexually assaulted in Kingston, Ontario, as "dainty co-eds"; and 
( d) he underestimated the violence of child sexual abuse when he 
prefaced comments on breast touching and the fondling of genitals with 
a "rightly or wrongly". Finally. the newspaper story reported that in a case 
several years previously, Judge Bourassa based a sentence on his belief 
that Inuit culture accepted that "when a girl begins to menstruate she is 
considered ready to engage in sexual relations". The comments generated 
widespread accusations of both racial and gender bias, a political storm, 
and eventually a judicial inquiry. 
Justice Conrad of the Alberta Queen's Bench conducted the Inquiry 
into whether these allegations were founded and, if so, whether they 
constituted grounds for the removal of Judge Bourassa from the bench. 
While Conrad J. criticized Bourassa J. for his "carelessness", his "crude­
ness", his choice of language and his outspokenness,88 she found that th� 
conduct of the reporter was problematic, that contemporary events tended 
to inflame the particular circumstances of this case (referring, for ex­
ample, to the Montreal massacre) and that personal popularity is not a 
precondition for judicial tenure.89 
More important for the purposes of this analysis are the standards 
which Conrad J. set for a determination of fitness and bias. Bias became 
important in this case as it was understood to be one example of conduct 
86. ( 1 0  October 1989), (N.W.T. Terr. Ct.) [unreported]. 
87. Re Inquiry Pursuant to 13(2) of Territorial Court Act; Re Inquiry into Conduct of Judge 
Bourassa, I 1990) N.W.T.R. 337 at 34 1 [hereinafter Bourassa Inquiry). 
88. /hid, at 348, 350.· 
89. /hid. at 349. 
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that was indicative of misbehaviour. In relation to fitness to serve Conrad 
J. invoked an extremely high standard: 
Are the comments so manifestly biased that, fairly determined in the light 
of all the circumstances, they inevitably lead the public to attribute such a 
defect of moral character to the judge that he would be seen to be unable 
to discharge his duties in an impartial way; have they destroyed unques­
ti()ning confidence in his moral integrity and honesty of decision making, 
thereby rendering him unfit for office?90 
"Inevitably" and "destroying unquestioning confidence in his moral 
integrity and honesty" are clearly higher thresholds than either "probabil­
ity" or "possibility". They represent standards of certitude. I� relation to 
actual bias, Conrad J ., drawing upon Grantham's Case, also espoused a 
very high test: 
I understand partisanship to mean a conscious partiality leading a Judge to 
be disloyal even to his own honest convictions. I understand it to mean that 
the Judge knows that justice demands that he should take one course but 
that his political alliance or political sympathies may be such that he 
deliberately chooses to adopt the other. In such a case the moral element 
undoubtedly enters into the definition of misconduct, and cannot be 
excluded.91 
Again, the emphasis on a judge's  subjectivity, knowledge and conscious­
ness appears to establish an extremely _high threshold. However, in 
relation to apprehension of bias she modified the threshold to bring it 
more into line with the Committee for Justice92 case (i.e., an objective and 
probabilistic test): 
the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and 
right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining 
thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that 
test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically 
and practically-and having thought the matter through--conclude."93 
Conrad J. was clear that given the high threshold there was no 
possibility of finding actual or conscious bias "against natives, women, 
northern Canadians, victims or intoxicated persons . . .  " or bias "in favour 
of accused persons."94 Indeed, to the contrary, she argued that "the 
evidence was unequivocal that Judge Bourassa is a conscientious judge, 
concerned with the culture and circumstances of the north. •'95 Nor did she 
find a reasonable apprehension of bias which, as we have seen, appears 
90. Ibid. at 345. 
9 1 .  Ibid. at 344. 
92. Supra note 56. 
93. Bourassa Inquiry, supra note 86 at 345. 
94. Ibid. at 344. 
95. Ibid. 
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to involve a somewhat lower objective and probabilistic threshold. 
Carefully reviewing each of the allegations against Judge Bourassa, she 
emphasized time and time again that the appropriate test was that of the 
perception of a reasonable, right minded, and fully informed observer 
who had all the facts available to her including, apparently, the judge's 
subjective state of mind. When applied to the facts, Justice Conrad found 
that this test had not been met. Thus, for example, in relation to the "pair 
of hips" comment, Conrad J. found that a "reasonable person would'' 
realize that this was Judge Bourassa 's "opinion of how the offender views 
women", not his own view;96 or, in relation to the characterization of child 
sexual abuse as "fondling", she suggested that the "informed person 
would'' realize that "Judge Bourassa was repeating a word used by the 
Crown prosecutor";97 or, again, in relation to the "rightly or wrongly" 
prefatory comment, Conrad J. determined: 
that a reasonable person would understand that Judge Bourassa was using 
the phrase, as it is frequently used, to describe the reason something 
happened, without commenting on it [sic] being right or wrong. It is a catch 
phrase that has nothing to do with right or wrong. It does not indicate a 
moral judgment. It is not a condonation of the action, nor does it indicate 
a bias.98 
Clearly, then, the effect (if not the rhetoric) of this Inquiry has been to 
set the standard for reasonable apprehension of bias at a fairly high level, 
with the consequence that no apprehension of bias could be attributed to 
the "careless" but "conscientious" Judge Bourassa. As was pointed out by 
Cote J.A. in a related Northwest Territories case, Conrad J. 's report 
"completely exonerated" Judge Bourassa.99 
In contrast, the test of reasonable apprehension of bias as applied to 
Sparks J. seems to be significantly lower. Consider, for example, the 
difference between Conrad J. 's reasons for decision and those of Glube 
C.J. Conrad J. carefully analyzed each of the allegations, filtered them 
through the prism of the reasonable apprehension of bias test as she 
understood it, and justified her conclusions. By way of contrast, Glube 
C.J. perfunctorily reiterated a test and rapidly jumped to the conclusion 
that a reasonable person might apprehend bias in Judge Sparks's com­
ments. This is a form of"I know it when I see it" legal reasoning, a method 
which is unfortunately not uncommon in this area of law. Great slogans 
can, sometimes, make bad law. 100 Instead of the appellate court invoking 
96. /hid. at 346 (emphasis added). 
97. /hid. at 347 [emphasis added). 
98. /hid. at 347 [emphasis added]. 
99. R. v. Doyle, ( 1992) N.W.T.R. 8 1  at 84 (C.A.). 
100. P. Strauss, "The Myth of Colour Blindness" ( 1 986) S. Ct. Rev. 99. 
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its supervisory power in such a conclusionary way, a more robust analysis 
might (in the spirit of Conrad J.) have asked the following types of 
questions : Could it not be argued that practically and realistically the 
reasonable, rightminded and fully informed observer would be aware of 
the research 101 indicating that not only is there some social consensus in 
Halifax that police officers overreact when dealing with Black people, '°2 
but also that there is widespread sociological and psychological evidence 
to support the proposition that police officers sometimes adopt negative 
attitudes and conduct towards members of the Black community? Could 
it not be argued that Sparks J., rather than being potentially biased, is a 
conscientious judge concerned with the culture and circumstance of 
Halifax's Black community? Or, is the difference that because Bourassa 
J. is White, male and Quebec-born he cannot be seen to have any 
particular stake in the outcome of decisions in the North, whereas Sparks 
J., as a Black person, is presumptively partisan as soon as she even 
mentions issues of race? 103 In other words, might it be that despite the fact 
that Glube C.J. invoked an "informed mind" test, in effect she applied a 
"suspicious mind" test? 
Indeed, a careful reading of her version of the test confirms that Glube 
C.J. may be applying a lower threshold. Instead of directly quoting 
precedent, she paraphrases it as whether a reasonable person "would 
conclude thatthe judge's impartiality mighrreasonably bequestioned." 104 
"Might" is much closer to a possibility test, whereas as I have argued in 
the previous section, the preferred trend is towards a probability test, i.e., 
more likely than not.105 As I read Glube C.J. 's decision, my impression is 
that she subjects any mention of race to a strict scrutiny test. That is, as 
I shall argue in Part VI, a mode of analysis which is deeply suspicious of 
discussions of race because of its commitment to colourblindness. The 
problem .with colourblindness is that it refuses to recognize that racial 
designations and categorizations can have different significances de­
pending on the context. In other words, while strict scrutiny and suspicion 
may be appropriate for certain situations where racialization is a variable, 
they need not always be appropriate. I will develop these points in Parts V 
and VI of t�is comment. But my main point remains that Glube C.J. 's 
101. Fora useful analysis of just how informed the "fully informed reasonable person" is. see 
Ruffo, supra note 39 at 194-201. 
102. Marshall Report, supra note I at vol. IV. 
I 03. For an eloquent criticism of such analyses, see Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, supra 
note 2, Higginbotham J. 
104. R.D.S. #4, supra note 23 at 10 (emphasis added). 
105. Note also that the Crown's factum advocates a "suspicion" test as outlined in R. v. 
Campbell, (supra note 70) though Glube C.J. did not refer to this explicitly in her own decision. 
/ ) 
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articulation of the test appears to be quite distinct from that of Conrad J. 
and this has direct consequences for the conclusions reached. 106 
Conrad J. emphasized that concerns about gender bias in the sentenc­
ing of a prominent member of the Inuit community by Bourassa J. were 
outside her mandate as a Judicial Inquiry, but would be dealt with in 
another forum, that is, in the form of an appeal. What is interesting about 
the subsequent appeal decision in R. v. A. 107 is that there is absolutely no 
mention of bias. The grounds of appeal filed by the Crown were silent on 
the question of bias and focussed instead on issues such as aggravating 
circumstances, breach of trust, rehabilitation and the principle of denun­
ciation. After a fairly lengthy decision discussing sentencing policies and 
practices in the Northwest Territories the appeal was dismissed, with very 
little reference to Bourassa J. Thus, not only has Bourassa J. been 
"completely exonerated" 108 but any concerns about bias have been 
juridically erased. Judge Sparks, however, experienced no such judicial 
I 06. A possible counterargument to the analysis offered here is that it is inappropriate to 
contrast the Marshall and Bourassa J. situations with ihat of Sparks J. because the circum­
stances are so different. Sparks J. has been simply overruled on appeal whereas BourassaJ. and 
the Reference Court judges faced possible removal from office. Accordingly, it can be argued 
that it is appropriate to have a higher standard for a finding of bias in the removal context than 
in an overruling context. Viewed in this light, a different standard need not constitute a double 
standard. 
While this argument has some potential merit I think that it is mistaken and can lead to some 
curious results. If there are two different standards available to determine what constitutes bias 
it could lead to the anomalous situation in which the same fact situation could generate two 
seemingly incompatible determinations. Assume, for example, that a judge does make a 
potentially racist comment and a party to the action decides not only to appeal the decision but 
also to complain to the Judicial Council. If we adopt two quite different tests, a lower threshold 
on appeal and a higher threshold in the complaint context, it could mean that the same statement 
could be found to be biased for the purpose of the appeal, but not biased for the purpose of the 
complaint. 
A more appropriate approach would, in my opinion, apply the same test to determine if the 
comment can be interpreted as racist. If the answer is "yes" to this first order question, this then 
leads to a set of second order questions. Is the comment so racist as to justify a successful 
appeal? Is the comment so racist as to justify removal from office? 
This proposed two-tiered approach has the benefit of promoting consistency in determining 
whether the comment manifests racial bias, while still allowing for flexibility in deciding what 
to do about that bias. Consequently, on my proposed approach, there could be a determination 
that a comment was racist, that the bias was such as to constitute the grounds for a successful 
appeal, but not sufficiently serious to justify a removal from judicial office. Bias may be one 
form of judicial misbehaviour. but not all misbehaviour renders a judge unfit to continue the 
judicial function. Such an approach allows the legal system to acknowledge rather than deny 
the possible existence of judicial racism and at the same time constructs a sliding scale of 
possible remedies to deal with the problem of racism. 
107. (1990) N.W.T.R. 36 (S.C.). 
l08. Supra note 87. 
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solidarity. 109 The next three sections will suggest that this can be ex­
plained because of the deep seated differences in judicial method, 
ideology and vision. 
V. A Contextual Legal Method 
One of the most disturbing things about R.D .S.# 1 is  the zeal with which 
the Crown has pursued the appeal. What is it about the statements made 
by Sparks J. that has provoked such an outcry and caused the Crown to 
argue not just that there was an apprehension of bias, but also the very 
unusual claim that there was actual bias? 1 1 0  As pointed out in Part II, when 
her comments are clarified Sparks J: seems to be making two points: first, 
that on occasion police officers may mislead the court; and second, that 
police officers sometimes overreact when dealing with Black youth. As 
I read her decision, all that she was doing was locating the evidence 
against the backdrop of this broader social knowledge. 1 1 1  In other words, 
she was simply adopting a contextual legal method. 1 12 
109. It is beyond the confines of this case comment to review the American law on judicial 
bias. However, it is to be noted that there have been a series of cases in the United States where 
Black judges have been challenged for bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. See Blank v. 
Sullivan & Cromwell, 4 18  F. Supp. I ( 1975); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, supra note 2; 
Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 5 18  F. Supp. 1017 ( 198 1 ) .  Each 
of these cases can be distinguished from R.D.S. on the facts as the challenges either referred 
to the prior employment of the judge (e.g. lawyer for the NAACP) or foroff the bench speeches 
they have made to Black organizations, or for their general legal philosophy. It is to be noted 
however that in every one of these cases the motions to recuse failed. 
Furthermore, it would appear that it is only in egregious situations that White American 
judges are accused of or disciplined for racial bias. Compare Palmore v.  Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 
( 1984) with Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 ( 1970) and Phillips v. Joint legislative Committee. 
637 F. 2d. 1014 ( 198 1 ), U.S. Cert. Den. 456 U.S. 960; U.S. Reh. Den. 457 U.S. 1 140. On the 
basis of these authorities, if the overruling of Judge Sparks stands she wi II have the distinction 
of being one of a select number of judges in North America since conquest to be officially 
sanctioned for racial bias! 
1 10. The Crown's factum is extremely adversarial, even hostile, to Sparks, J . ,  unabashedly 
accusing her of "racial bias" and "strong bias" against the police (at 14). It is to be noted that 
the police chief, at least in interviews with the media, seems to have disagreed with the Crown. 
Chief MacDonald is reported to have said, "Comments that create apprehension of bias don't 
constitute real bias." 8. Dorey, supra note 20. 
1 1 1 . As RehnquistJ. has phrased it, "proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court 
was a complete tabula rasa . . .  would be evidence of lack of qualification. not lack of bias." 
Tatum v. Laird 409 U.S. 824 at 835 ( 1972). 
1 1 2. It is beyond the parameters of this comment to fully delineale the characteristics of a 
contextual legal method. However, it is probably best understood in contradistinction to 
abstractionism. the idea that legal rules have universal qualities and are relatively uncontami­
nated by the diversity of the contexts to which they apply. Contextualism, to the contrary. 
acknowledges that legal rules are inherently indeterminate, that their meanings can be only 
explored through an awareness of their impact in the diverse situations in which they might be 
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It can be argued that judges routinely and uncontroversially make 
reference to issues of common knowledge. For example, Judge Bourassa 
suggested that alcohol was often involved in situations of sexual assault. 
Conrad J . , in conducting the judicial inquiry wrote: 
Judge Bourassa's comments with respect to persons being drunk is a 
statement of his observation from his experience. An informed person 
would learn that alcohol is frequently involved in sexual assault cases, and 
Judge Bourassa cannot be faulted for saying so. Indeed, alcohol is involved 
in many crimes, both in the north and the south, and Judge Bourassa is not 
denying the involvement of alcohol in sexual assault cases in the south. 1 13  
On the basis of this standard would an informed person really believe 
that police officers never mislead a court and that judges should automati­
cally assume that an officer's interpretation of events is necessarily 
accurate? Surely not. 1 14 Consider, for example, the conduct of Sergeant 
Mac In tyre in the Donald Marshall Jr. prosecution, 1 1 5  or the fact that police 
officers manufactured evidence in the Guy Paul Morin case. 1 16 Judge 
Sparks' s comment when taken in proper context was simply a rebuttal of 
the Crown's strategy of encouraging prejudgment by pitting "a presump­
tively credible police officer against a presumptively dishonest . . .  
defendant. " 1 17 Only someone who has either a naively optimistic vision 
of police officers 1 18 or a vested interest in securing judicial deference to 
police officers' testimony could interpret this manifestly practical and 
importantly for the purposes of this comment, a contextual approach encourages judges to 
consider the broader social context as they apply and interpret legal rules. As a judiciaJ method 
it has been discussed most explicitly by Wilson J. in R. v. Morgantaler ( 1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 
385 at 483 (S.C.C.); and Edmonton Journal v. A.-G. for Alberta ( 1990), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577 
at 581-84 (S.C.C.); and L'Heureux-Dube J. in Moge v. Moge, ( 1 992) 3 S.C.R. 8 1 3; Young v. 
Young, [ 1993) 4 S.C.R. 3; and Willick v. Willick ( 1995), 173 N.R. 321 (S.C.C). See also Vriend 
v. Alberta ( 1994), 18  Alta. L.R. (3d) 286 (Q.B.). 
1 1 3 .  Bourassa Inquiry, supra note 86 at 346. 
1 14 .  See e.g., People v. Berrois 270 N.E. 2d 709 ( 1 97 1 ); A. Dershowitz, The Best Defense 
(New York: Random House, 1982) at xxi-xxii; and W. Stuntz, "Warrants and Fourth 
Amendment Remedies" ( 199 1 )  77 Va. L. Rev. 88 1 ,  fora discussion of warrants in the context 
of police perjury, and some suggestions as to why police officers ·may be dishonest. See also 
C. Steiker, "Second Thoughts on First Principles" ( 1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 870 at 853-54; 
Mo lien Commission, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti 
Corruption Procedures of the New York City Police Department (New York: The Commission, 
1 993); P. Hoffman, "The Feds, Lies and Videotapes; The Need for an Effective Federal Role 
in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America" ( 1993) 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1455. 
1 1 5. Marshall Report, supra note I, at 37-43. 
I 16. Professor Don Stuart reminded me of this example. 
1 1 7. Stuntz, supra note 1 14 at 915 .  
I 1 8. See generally, McDonald Commission, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain 
Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Ottawa: The Commission, 1981 ); R. v. 
Baylis ( 1988), 66 Sask. R. 268 at 284 (C.A.), acknowledging the possibility of intimidation or 
coercion by the R.C.M.P. 
( 
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realistic statement as being biased. As a colleague has pointed out, if we 
really thought that the police always told the truth, then we would not 
need trials! i 19 
Thus, I would suggest that it is the second statement that is at the core 
of the Crown's allegation of bias. But again, is it really bias for a judge 
to suggest that sometimes police officers overreact when dealing with 
non-white groups? This is admittedly more controversial that the sugges­
tion that police officers sometimes mislead the court, but it is both 
defensible and supportable. I20 
The question of the relationship between the criminal justice system 
and race has been the subject of extensive study121  in the United King­
dom, 122 and the United States, 123 and some study in Canada. I24 On the basis 
I I 9. For a brief account of the fate of another non-traditional judge who, among other things, 
was critical of police testimony, see D. Gibson & L. Gibson, Substantial Justice: Law and 
Lawyers in Manitoba 1670-1970 (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1972) at 258-65 . 
120. Professor Black has suggested that I cite C.N.N.'s coverage of the Simpson trial and in 
particular the racial prejudice of Detective Fuhnnan. Others have suggested that r refer to police 
beatings and shootings of visible minority citizens in Toronto, Montreal, Los Angeles etc. Lest 
these obvious sources be seen to be too anecdotal, what follows is a more scholarly, if brief, 
review of some of the pertinent academic literature. 
121 .  Sec e.g., L. Lewis & J. Gladstone, Racism in the Criminal Justice System: A Bibliogra­
phy (Toronto: Centre for Criminology, 1994 ); D. Baker, ed., Reading Racism and the Criminal 
Justice System (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1994); M.P. Feldman, The Psychology of 
Crime: A Social Science Textbook (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 92-95. 
122. E. Cashmore & E. McLaughl in, eds., Out of Order? Policing Black People (London: 
Routledge, 1991); T. Jefferson, "Race, Crime, Policing: Empirical, Theoretical and Meth­
odological Issues" ( 1988) 16  lnt'I J. of Soc. of Law 521 ;  "Symposium: Race, Criminal Justice 
and the Legal System" ( 1989) 16 New Community 1 . 
123. C.R. Mann, Unequal Jwtice: A Question of Color (Bloomington: Indian University 
Press, 1993); C. Owen & J. Bell, eds., Blacks and Criminal Justice (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, 1977); C. Steiker, "Second Thoughts About First Principles" (1994) 107 
Harv. L. Rev. 820; "Symposium: Criminal Law. Criminal Justice and .Race" ( 1993) 67 Tulane 
L.R. 1725; "Symposium on the Impact of the Judicial System on the Status of African 
American Males" ( 1994) 23 Cap. U.L. Rev. I ; "Symposium on Race and Criminal Justice" 
(1994) 5 1  Washington and Lee L. Rev. 357. 
1 24. Bellemare Rapport, Rapport du Comite d' enquete sur /es relations entre /es corps 
po/iciers et /es minorities ethniques et visible (Montreal: la Commission, 1989); Law Refonn 
Commission of Canada, Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice (Ottawa: The 
Commission, 1991); _Symposium on Race Relations and Law (Vancouver, B.C.), Race 
Relations and the Law: Report of a Symposium Held in Vancouver, British Columbia, April 22-
24, 1982 (Ottawa: Minister of State, Multiculturalism, 1983). There may be two reasons 
conjectured for the poverty of Canadian research, the first problematic, the second controver­
sial. It may be that there is just not a great deal of scholarly interest in (or research support for) 
studies on racism and the criminal justice system. Secondly, unlike the Un ited States or the 
United Kingdom, in Canada official statistics for crime do not include the categories of race 
or ethnicity. One reason why this may be legitimate is that such figures can be used to construct 
images of non-white communities as "crime prone". On the other hand, without basic empirical 
data, it is more difficult to analyze police-non-white interactions. For accounts of police 
releasing racially categorized crime statistics in the "Jane-Finch" area of North York, see The 
Toronto Star ( 17, 24 February 1989). 
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of "objective" criteria such as statistics on arrest, 125 incarceration rates, 126 
and the application of the death penalty l27 the evidence is overwhelming 
that "non-white" groups are disproportionately represented. 128 The ques­
tion of police interaction with "non-white" groups is somewhat more 
difficult to get an angle on because it requires studies that cannot be 
reduced to quantitative analyses. Thus the data are dependent more upon 
observations and perceptions, and are therefore perceived to be some­
what "softer". With this caveat in mind, the vast majority of the studies 
do indicate a more negative relationship betw(?en the police and "non­
white" groups than between the police and White groups. Race, it can be 
said, frequently serves as a proxy for criminality. 129 
Generally speaking the evidence can be grouped under two method­
ological rubrics: sociological research and psychological research. So­
ciological research attempts to assess perceptions of police-"non-white" 
interactions. All studies in this regard indicate that "non-white" commu­
nities perceive themselves as being the victims of disparate police 
attention and conduct. 130 Moreover the Marshall Inquiry has accepted a 
125. "Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System" ( 1992) 
16 Hamline L. Rev. 475 at 49 1-93; R. Reiner, "Race and Criminal Justice" ( 1989) 16 New 
Community 5; Marshall Report. supra note I at 151, 191. It is to be noted, however, that in 
relation to sentencing the Marshall Inquiry conducted a survey which indicated that race was 
not a direct factor, though it did highlight other significant social variables. Ibid. at 191. 
126. M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada: A Report of the Committee of the Canadian 
Bar Association on Imprisonment and Release (Vancouver: The Association, 1988) at 83; 
Marshall Report, supra note I at 150, 160; B. Meierhofer, "The Role of Offence and Offender 
Characteristics in Federal Sentencing" ( 1992) 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 367 at 388-89; J. Kramer, 
"Introduction" ( 1993) 67 Tulane L. Rev. 1725 at 1726. 
127. D .C. Baldus, Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990); F. Weatherspoon, "The Devastating Impact of 
the Justice System on the Status of African-American MaJes: An Overview Perspective" 
( 1994) Cap. U.L. Rev. 23 at 4�50; Mann, supra note 123 at 202-03. 
128. To the ex tent that there is debate, it tends to revolve llround whether this overrepresentation 
is intentional or systemic, overt or subtle, or whether other variables (e.g., class, demeanour) 
are just as determinative as race. See Jefferson, supra note 122 at 527; Reiner, supra note 125 
at 12. 
129. M. Brown, Working the Street: Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of Reform (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1981) at 170; S. Johnson, "Race and the Decision to Detain 
a Suspect" ( 1983) 93 Yale L.J. 2 14; "Development in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process" 
( 1988) I O I  Harv. L. Rev. 1472; T. Maclin, "'Black and Blue Encounters'-Some Preliminary 
Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Maner?" (1991) Val. U.L. 
Rev. 243. 
130. See e.g., Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Ontario) (Toronto: Task 
Force, 1989) at 152-59; Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 124 at 5; Marshal{ 
Report. supra note I at 157; C. Ungerleider & J. McGregor, "Police Challenge 2000: Issues 
Affecting Relations Between Police and Minorities in Canada" ( 1991) Cdn. J. of Criminology 
555 at 558; A. Normandeau, "Police, Race and Ethnicity in Montreal" ( 1988) 4 Crimecare J. 3. 
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report which acknowledges that many Nova Scotians, both Black and 
White, believe that police officers discriminate against Blacks. rn 
Psychological research tends to be categorized as "police psychology" 
and attempts to focus on police attitudes. 132 While some studies tend to 
show that police officers have a higher level of racial intolerance than 
many other members of society, 133 and others indicate that they have a 
similar level of racial intolerance as the "nonnal" general public, 134 there 
appears to be broad consensus that police officers tend to identify with 
middle-class and White groupsns and have a negative attitude towards 
members of "non-white" communities. 136 Furthennore, the findings of 
these types of studies seem to have been accepted by several recent 
commissions that have studied police conduct, not only in the U .S. 137 but 
also in Canada. 138 
Thus, it can be argued that what Judge Sparks was doing was simply 
articulating what a fully infonned, reasonable person would know: that 
racism is pervasive in Canadian society and that "practically and realis­
tically" police officers may be predisposed to overreacting when dealing 
with Black youth. Nor has she been alone in acknowledging the context 
of racialization. Other (White, male) judges have made similar com­
ments, apparently without censure. Doherty, J.A., speaking for a unani­
mous Ontario Court of Appeal, has recently acknowledged that: 
1 3 1 .  Marshall Report, supra note I at 182-86, 259. 
132. Sec e.g., C. Bartal & G. Bergen, "Introduction: Police Psychology and its Future" ( 1992) 
19 Criminal Justice and Behaviour 236. Researchers in this tradition frequently caution that 
there is no direct nexus between attitude and behaviour. 
1 33. ·A. Neiderhoffer, Behind the Shield: Police in Urban Society (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1967); A. Colman & L. Gorman, "Conservatism, Dogmatism and Authoritarianism 
in British Police Officers" (1982) 16 Sociology I .  
134. D. Bayley & H. Mendelsohn,Minorities and the Police: Confrontation in America (New 
York: Free Press, 1969) al 145; Marshall Report, supra note 1 at vol. IV, 187; C. Ungerleider, 
"lntercultural Awareness and Sensitivity of Canadian Police Officers" (1989) 32 Can. Pub. 
Admin. 6 12. 
I 35. S. Perrot & D. Taylor, "Ethnocentrism and Authoritarianism in the Police: Challenging 
Stereotypes and Reconceptualizing lngroup Identification" ( 1994) 24 J. of Applied Soc. Psych. 
1640 al 1651-52. 
1 36. Jefferson, supra note 122 at 522; Reiner, supra note 125 at 7-8. 
137. Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department ( 1991) 
at 69-75; "Repon and Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Coun Racial and Ethnic Bias 
Study Commission" ( 1991) 19 Florida State U.L. Rev. 591 ;  Minnesota Task Force Report, 
supra note 125; "Repon of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities ( 1992)" 
reprinted in ( 1992) 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 185. . 
138; Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Ontario), The Report of the Race Relations and 
Policing Task Force (Toronto: The Task Force, 1989); Race Relations and Policing Task Force 
(Ontario), The Report of the Race Relations and Polil'ing TaJk Force (Toronto: The Task 
Force, 1992); Review of Race Relations Practices of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force 
(Toronto: Metropolitan Audit Department, 1992). 
/ 
/ 
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[r]acism, and in particular anti-black racism, is part of our community 's 
psyche. A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist 
views. A much larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of 
negative racial stereotypes. Furthennore, our institutions, including the 
criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative stereo­
types. 139 
Niederm_ayer J., of the Nova Scotia Family Court, has been even more 
candid: 
[ t ]he issue of racism existing in Nova Scotia has been well documented in 
the Marshall Inquiry Report . . . A person would have to be stupid, 
complacent or ignorant not to acknowledge its presence, not only individu­
ally but also systemically and institutionally . 140 
In Glube C.J. ' s  estimation, however, such an acknowledgement consti­
tutes an apprehension of bias! 141 
In the next section I will suggest that this sharp difference in opinion 
as to the appropriate judicial method can be traced to competing ideolo­
gies about the judicial role in a pluralistic democracy. 
VI. Impartiality and Racial Identity: 
Colourblindness or Colour Contextualism 
Beyond the specifics of this particular scenario, the case also raises 
fundamental questions about the nature of good judging in contemporary 
society and the thorny issue of whether we should aspire to a socially 
representative judiciary. It also asks us to revisit our conceptions· of 
equality and how they inform our understandings of appropriate judicial 
decision-mak.ing. 142 
For heuristic purposes, it can be said that there are two broad views of 
the appropriate role of a judge, each of which is informed by a vision of 
1 39. R. v. Parks ( 1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 at 369 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal denied f 1994) 
I S.C.R. x. 
140. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. S.M.S. ( 1992), I IO N.S.R. (2d) 91 at 
109 (Fam. Ct.), affd ( 1992). 1 12 N.S.R. (2d) 258 (C.A.). See also Dartmouth/Halifax County 
Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks ( 1 992), 1 12 N.S.R. (2d) 389 (S.C.), rev'd on other 
grounds ( 1993), 1 19 N.S.R. (2d) 9 1  (C.A.). 
1 4 1 .  Some readers may be concerned that I have drawn too heavily on American materials 
and that it is inappropriate to assume that the Canadian context is similar. Two responses are 
available. First, I have referred to several Canadian studies and they confirm that there arc 
similar patterns in both countries. Second, we might be able to draw upon the environmental 
legal standard of the "precautionary principle". That is, rather than assuming that racism in the 
legal system is non-existent, until extensive research is available in Canada to indicate 
otherwise, we should err on the side of caution and equality and recognize that there is a real 
danger of racism. 
142. See generally, Appointing Judges, supra note 4; and "Symposium on Judicial Election, 
Selec1ion and Accountability" ( 1 988) 6 1  S. Cal. L. Rev. 1555. 
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equality: the. formalists and the realists. The formalists have high hopes. 
Their conception of impartiality is premised upon a formal conception 
not only of equality, but also the judicial role. Formalists believe that the 
judge is to divest him/herself of all preconceptions and identifications, to 
discover and apply the relevant law as s/he finds it, and to treat everyone 
the same without regard to race, class, gender or whatever. 1�3 Themis 
blindfolded is their icon, and equality before the law is their mantra. 144 
Realist judges are much more pragmatic in their outlook. They 
recognize that both they and those who appear before them have contexts 
and experiences that inform their understandings and their conduct-. 145 
Realists acknowledge that these admittedly complicating variables are 
ineradicable and that rather than ignoring them, we should be conscious 
of the possible implications-both positive and negative-of such vari­
ables.146 From this perspective, impartiality requires both an awareness of 
these contaminating factors 147 and empathy 148 so as to offset imp.licit and 
taken for granted assumptions.149 
143. See, for example, the proposition that "a defendant is entitled to the cold neutrality of 
an impartial judge . . .  that no judge shall preside [where) . . .  he is not wholly free, disinterested 
impartial and independent." United States v. Orbiz 366 F. Supp. 628 at 629 (D.R.P. 1973). See 
also M. Hoeflich & J. Deutsch, "Judicial Legitimacy and the Disinterested Judge" ( 1978) 6 
Hofstra L. Rev. 769. 
144. D. Curtis & J. Resnik, "Images of Justice" ( 1987) 96 Yale L.J. 1 727. 
145. For example, Cardozo argues that judges are shaped by 
the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits 
and convictions, which make the man [sic J . . . . The great tides and currents which engulf 
the rest of men do not tum aside in their course, and pass the judges by. 
B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 92 1 )  at 
1 67-68. Similarly. it has been suggested that "while an · overspeaking judge is no well tuned 
symbol' neither is an amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions a becoming receptacle 
for judicial power". Berger v. U.S., 255 U.S. 22 at 43 ( 1920), McReynolds J., dissenting. See 
also R. Abella, '"The Dynamic Nature of Equality" in S. Martin & K. Mahoney. eds .• Equality 
and Judicial Neutrality (Calgary: Carswell, 1987) at 3, 8-9. 
146. Parks, supra note 139 at 353, 366; S. Abrahamson, "The Woman Has Robes: Four 
Questions" ( 1984) 14 Golden Gate L. Rev. 489; Omatsu, supra note 4 at 144; J. Resnick, "On 
the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges" ( 1988) 61 S. Cal . L. 
Rev. 1877. 
141. R. v. MacKay ( 1980). 54 C.C.C. (2d) 1 29 at 156 (S.C.C.); R. MacGregor Dawson, The 
Government of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) at 435. 
148. As Madame Justice Wilson has graphically stated, the judge must try to "enter the skin 
of the litigant and make his or her experience part of (the judge's) experience . . .  ". "Will Women 
Judges Really Make a Difference?" ( 1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507 at 52 1 .  Or again, as Carter 
J. has suggested. the "fact finder must 'walk a mile in the victim's shoes . . . .  " Harris v. 
International Paper, 765 F. Supp. 1509 at 15 16  ( 1991 ). 
149. As Judge Jerome Frank has powerfully argued: 
If . . .  "bias" and "partiality" be defined 10 mean 1he total absence of preconceptions in 
the mind of 1he judge. then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will . The 
/ 
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In relation to issues of race, the fonnalists and the realists may have two 
very different judicial philosophies. Fonnalists will incline towards a 
"colourblind" 150 approach: the assumption will be that each person is an 
individual and that racial identity (in the sense of skin colour) is an 
irrelevant consideration, unless its specific relevance can be demon­
strated in a particular case. A classic example of such a position is to be 
found in McC/eskey v. Kemp in which the American Supreme Court 
accepted the validity of statistics which demonstrated that in Georgia 
murder defendants whose victims were White were four times more 
likely to receive the death penalty than murder defendents whose victims 
were Black, but held that this did not prove that McCleskey personally 
had been the victim of racially prejudiced jurors. 151  As part of the reasons 
for reaching this result the Court suggested that if it were to acknowledge 
racial prejudice in the context of death sentences, it would also have to 
consider racism in other aspects of sentencing! 152 
For realists, race matters. 153 They eschew colourblindness because 
they recognize that racialization (in the sense of hierarchical social 
relations on the basis of race) is still an extremely important social factor 
and, therefore, that legal decision-making should always be sensitive to 
the possibility that race is a variable. 154 Thus, facially neutral and 
human mind, even in infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with 
predispositions; and the process of education, formal and informal, creates attitudes 
in all men [sic] which affect them in judging situations, attitudes which precede 
reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by definition, are prejudices. 
Without acquired "slants", pre-conceptions, life could not go on . . . .  The standard of 
dispassionateness obviously does not require the judge to rid himself of the uncon­
scious influence of such social attitudes. 
In addition to those acquired social value judgments, every judge, however, has 
many unavoidable idiosyncratic "learnings of the mind," uniquely personal preju­
dices which may interfere with his fairness . . . .  The conscientious judge will, as far 
as possible, make himself aware of his biases of this character, and, by that very self­
knowledge, nullify their effect. Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting 
on a Black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and 
strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine. [footnotes 
omitted) 
Re J. P. Linahan, 138 F. 2d 650 at 651-53 (2d Cir 1943). See also, Minow, supra note 9, for 
an extensive elaboration of this perspective, as well as her more recent "Str ipped Down Like 
a Runner or Enriched By Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors" ( 1992) 33 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1201. 
1 50. Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 559 ( 1 896). HarlanJ.,dissenting; over 'd by Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 at 494 ( 1954). 
1 5 1 .  48 1 U.S. 279 ( 1987). 
1 52. Ibid. at 3 1 5-16. 
1 53. C. West, Race Mauers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993). 
1 54. "[O)ne should never automatically assume that racism and discrimination only 
occurred in the past." Marshall Report, supra note I at 149. 
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seemingly identical treatment may in fact be discriminatory because not 
everyone is similarly situated and, therefore, the pursuit of equality may 
require different treatment. 155 Realists do not repress questions of race, 
they confront them. Viewed in this light, interpreting a sensitivity to the 
racialized practices of Canadian society as bias only makes sense if one 
is premising one's accusation on some underlying legal philosophy that 
incorporates the myth of colourless individualism. 1 56 The difference, 
then, between Sparks J. 's decision and Glube C .J. 's is that the former may 
be a realist who is willing to contextualize issues of race whereas the latter 
maybe a formalist who mistakes colourblindness for cultural neutrality. 
To be clear, such a context sensitive and racially conscious judicial 
method engenders the judicial obligation to judge, not prejudge. 1 57 It does 
not mean that in every negative interaction between a White police officer 
and a Black person the latter will inevitably be found to be credible. 
Rather, it means that in applying the traditional assumption of innocent 
until proven gui lty, judges should be aware of the larger social dynamics 
of a racially stratified society, 158 so that when charges are laid convictions 
can only be imposed when the judge is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Black person is guilty. Th_is is very different from the 
position adopted by the Crown at the trial level which advocated a 
presumption of guilt if a police officer says so! As Judge Jerome Frank 
has argued, "[i]mpartiality is not gullibility [and d]isinterestedness does 
not mean child-like innocence. "1 59 In short, by resisting the presumption 
155. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, ( 1989) I S.C.R. 143 at 1 7 1, Mclntryre J. 
156. T.A. Alienilcoff, "A Case for Race-Consciousness" (199 1 )  9 1  Columbia L.R. 1060; D. 
Greene, "Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and the Myth of Colorless 
Individualism in Bostid. v. Florida" (1993) Tulane L. Rev. 1979; B. Flagg, "Was Blind but 
Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent" ( 1993) 
9 1  Mich. L. Rev. 953; N. Gotanda, "A Critique of 'Our Constitution is Colorblind"' ( 1991) 44 
Stan. L. Rev. l ;  D. Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" ( 1 986) Sup. Ct. Rev. 99. 
151. R. v. Stark, supra note 44 at 68; Committee/or Justice, supra note 56 at 391. 
158. Parks, supra note 139 at 366-70. See also, s. 1 5(2) Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
I 982, c. I I, s. 1 5(2). 
1 59. Linahan.supra note 149 at 654. In the Canadian context Watt J. has argued that a judge 
should approach his/her tasks "with a mind that is and appears to be open to reason and 
persuasion, not with one that is empty of it and unschooled by experience." R. v. Bertram. supra 
note 4 1  at 63. Along the same lines Watt J. has recently argued: 
In everyday speech, "bias" is descriptive of a leaning, inclination, bent or predisposition 
towards one side or another, or a particular result. In legal proceedings, "bias" 
represents a predisposition lo decide an issue or a cause in a certain way which does 001 
leave the judicial mind perfectly open to persuasion or conviction. Bias is a condition 
or state of mind which sways judgment, hence renders a judicial officer unable to 
discharge their duties in a particular case with the impartiality that is quintessential lo 
the judicial function. It generally refers to the mental attitude or disposition of the judge 
/ 
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of police rectitude, Judge Sparks's decision manifests the virtues of an 
�pen mind, precisely the standard that was outlined by the Inquiry 
Committee of the Judicial Council in the Donald Marshall Jr. case: 
True impartiality is not so much not holding views and having opinions, 
but the capacity to prevent them from interfering with a willingness to 
entertain and act on different points of view. Whether or not a judge was 
biased, in our view, thus becomes less instructive an exercise than whether 
or not the judge's decision or conduct reflected an incapacity to hear and 
decide a case with an open mind. 160 
VII. What is Bias? 
The previous sections have suggested that Glube C.J.'s decision is 
mistaken for two reasons: first, it rejects a contextualist legal method; and 
second, it is premised upon formalistic preconceptions of equality and the 
judicial function. In this section l will suggest a third weakness in her 
decision: an inadequate understanding of what bias might mean. 
A major problem with the case Jaw in this area is the unreflective way 
in which judges have approached the very concept of bias. Usually it is 
considered to be interchangeable with cognate concepts such as partial­
ity, prejudice, position, perspective, inclination, orientation, predisposi­
tion, leaning, partisan, antagonism, animosity, interest, favouritism, 
connection, or engagement. However, such an exercise in literalist 
towards a pany-litigant, rather than any views that the judge may entenain regarding 
the actual subject-mailer of the dispute. R. v. Gushman, supra note 46 at para. 29. 
Funher suppon for the argument that Sparks J. was simply replying 10 the Crown's argument 
in favour of priorizing a police officer's testimony can be garnered from a quotation she 
reproduces in her supplementary reasons (which were excluded by Glube CJ.): 
[o]nce found 10 be competent, every witness starts out on the same footing with equal 
credit, although the accused has an enhanced position, ultimately because the burden 
of proof is upon the Crown. In our system we haxe no feudal-like categorization of 
witnesses. such that for example, from the moment they take the stand, t�e lord has more 
credit than the peasant, the educated than the illiterate, the propenied than the 
impoverished or the man than the woman. Nor ought there be any unstated informally­
understood division, such that for example, entering the court room, the police officer 
hos more credit than the alleged speeder, be he or she a school principoi or a student. 
That is not to say that witnesses remain of equal credit throughout the proceedings, but 
only that they begin on the same footing. 
Emphasis added by Sparks J., quoting Hon. G. Seniuk, "Judicial Fact Finding and a Theory of 
Credit" ( 1994) 18(3) Prov. Judges Journal 4 at 15. R.D.S. #3, supra note 2 1 .  
1 60. Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Inquiry Committee Established Pursuant 
to Subsection 63( I) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Novo Scotia 
(August 1990) at 26. This paragraph is omitted from the version of the repon published in the 
U.N.B.L.J .• supra note 84. See also, Minow, "Stripped", supra note 149, at 1217; J.8.8. v. 
J.A.B. ( 1 992). 1 1 3 N.S.R. (2d) 60 (C.A.); R. v. St. Lawrence Cement, ( 1993] OJ. No. 1442 
(Q.L.). 
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reductionism oversimplifies the matter. As the discussion outlining the 
differences between realists and formalists has indicated, the whole point 
of judging is to take a position, to reach a determination that inevitably 
favours one party and is detrimental to the interests of another. Moreover, 
as I have suggested, it is not feasible (nor, in my opinion, desirable) to 
expect judges to come to their tasks unencumbered with the messy 
realities of their experiences. The core and ultimately unavoidable 
problem in the law of judicial bias is to determine which biases or 
prejudices or perspectives are legitimate and which are not. 161 And this is 
a necessarily normative decision that cannot be avoided by facile formai­
istic reasoning. As Scalia J., (hardly the most progressive of judges 162) of 
the U.S. Supreme Court has recently pointed out, even though there is 
universal hatred for Adolf Hitler, it would not be accurate to say that 
people are biased or prejudiced against him. For Scalia J., the pejorative 
connotation of the words "bias" and "prejudice" require that an opinion 
be "wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved or because 
it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess . . .  or 
because it is excessive in degree . . . .  " In short, an opinion must manifest 
"a deep seated favouritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 
impossible''. 163 In my opinion, nothing in Judge Sparks's remarks could 
be considered to be undeserved or excessive in degree; nor could it be said 
she ought not to possess knowledge of polite-Black interactions, or even 
that she has shown a deep seated favouritism or antagonism. 
Glube's CJ. 's decision assiduously avoids such normative questions. 
As I have pointed out previously, her discussion of the potentially 
relevant law is perfunctory, and the extent of the reasoning negligible. But 
the effect of such shoot-from-the-hip legal decision-making is to tender 
invisible by judicial fiat the reality of Canadian racism. The next section 
considers several consequences that may result from such an approach. 
VIII. / mpact 
Legal decisions can have consequences not only for the parties to a particular 
case but also more generally. This is particularly true when a case like this 
occurs in a province like Nova Scotia which has ongoing racial problems. 
First, because of Glube C.J.' s decision, the youth in this case will have to face 
a new trial. At least two years of his life will have passed in the shadow of 
161. Parks, supra note 1 39 at 364; P. Cain, "Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist 
Theory and Judging" ( 1988) 61 So. Cal. L. Rev; 1945. 
162. City of Richmond v. Croson, I 09 S. Ct. 706 ( 1 989); "The Disease as Cure: In Order to 
Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race" ( 1979) Wash. U .L.Q. 14 7. 
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these legal charges. Moreover, the Crown will have a second opportunity to 
better prepare its case; perhaps the Crown will call more than one witness. 
Moreover, it should be noted that while it is usual in situations where a 
reasonable apprehension of bias is found to order a new trial in front of a 
different judge, the effect of doing so in this particular case is to ensure that 
the next judge will be White because apart from Judge Sparks there are no 
Black judges in Nova Scotia. In short, the effect, if not the intent, of 
succumbing to the Crown's hardball tactic of alleging racially motivated bias 
has been "judge shopping" on the basis of race. 
Second, Nova Scotia's Black community is told in no uncertain terms 
that their experiences and perceptions are of no legal weight, and that 
even a Black judge cannot challenge the pervasive racism that continues 
to saturate Canadian society. 164 Empathy is trashed, 165 denial reigns 
supreme, 166 and it is the police officer who is presented as the victim of 
a racialJy hostile Black judge. 
Third, the judicial community generally is affected by this decision. 
Echoing several other cases where a reasonable apprehension of bias has 
been found by an appeal court, 167 Glube C.J. comments that "it would be 
better if Judge Sparks had not made these comments". There are at least 
two potential problems with such a lamentation. It tends to have a chilling 
effect on lower-level judicial decision-making, discouragingjudges from 
"speak[ing] directly,even bluntly, so that there will beno misunderstand­
ing of what they mean." 168 Moreover, by dampening judicial candour 
1 64. Parks, supra note 1 39 at 367-69. 
165. For discussions of the relationship between empathy and objectivity, see K. Karst, 
"Judging and Belonging" ( 1988)61 S. Cal. L . Rev. 1 957 at 1966; J. Webber, "The Adjudication 
of Contested Social Values: Implications of Attitudinal Bias for the Appointment of Judges" 
in Appointing Judges, supra note at 3, 24. 
1 66. Glube C.J. is, of course, not alone in her seeming unwillingness to confront Nova 
Scotia's racial problems. Perrot and Taylor, in their attempt to defend police officers ·from 
accusations of being especially ethnocentric or authoritarian, do acknowledge that their 
research indicates that the "police attribute the locus of negative relations to the community and 
not to their own attitudes and actions." Perrot and Taylor, supra note 1 35 at 1 655. Reiner has 
identified a similar attitude among chief constables in England and Wales, supra note 125 at 8. 
My research for this comment has made it abundantly obvious that, relative to the United 
Kingdom and the United States, Canadian research on the issue of racism and the criminal 
justice system is underdeveloped: ignorance is bliss. (It should be acknowledged, though, that 
some work has been done in relation to First Nations people.) In the U.S. many state Supreme 
Couns have taken the initiative and have established task forces to identify the problems and 
to generate some possible solutions. See J .  Resnick, "Revising the Canon" ( 1993) 61 Cinn. L. 
Rev. 1 197 Appendix I for a list of such task forces. Perhaps the time has come for Canadian 
couns to take their heads out of the sand. For an overview of some of the American initiatives 
see S. Scasnecchia, "State Responses 10 Task Force Repons on Race and Ethnic Bias in the 
Couns" ( 1 992) 16 Hamline L. Rev. 923. 
167. See e.g. R. v. J.F.A. ( 1993), 82 C.C.C. (3d) 295 (Ont. C.A.). 
168. Per MacEachem C.J. in Report of the Inquiry Committee, supra note 84 at 229. 
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Glube CJ. seems to be implicitly suggesting that judges may think things, 
but not say them. 169 If this is the case, it runs counter to the ethical norm 
of judicial openness. More generally, judges are put on notice that 
decision-making should aspire to being ahistorical and decontextual and 
that colourblind formalism is the appropriate judicial role. 
Fourth, and finally, Judge Sparks has not only been overruled on 
appeal, she has been disciplined. In effect, she has been told that she is not 
to raise issues of race; that in donning her judicial robes she is to sevet 
herself from her community, that in taking her position on the bench she 
is to forget her experientially informed knowledge, 170 and that she is to 
adopt a neutral (a.k.a. White) role. 171 By conflating prior knowledge with 
prejudice,172 Glube CJ. has subordinated integrity 173 to assimilationist 
conventionalism. 174 On a symbolic level, the decision seems to indicate 
169. To be clear, my point is not that judges should be unrestrained in their statements. Rather 
I would suggest that, like all of us, they should be self-reflective about their thoughts and 
consider the possible effects of their statements. However, if after reflection a judge believes 
that certain variables have had an impact on his/her decision, it is essential that the judge be 
explicit as to what these variables are. 
1 70. Such devaluations are not unprecedented. W. Wilbanks, The Myth of A Racist Criminal 
Justice System (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1987) at 70 rejects the extensive American 
literature on racism because it relies on "anecdotes, common sense scenarios, or statements 
from authorities such as Black judges who assert that racism is pervasive in law enforcement." 
1 7 1 .  For a review of arguments demonstrating the benefits of the appointment of minority and 
female judges see S. Goldman, "Should there be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?" ( 1979) 
62 Judicature 488; S. Manin, "Women as Lawmakers" ( 1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 738; C. Menke I 
Meadow, "Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the 
Law" (1987) U. Miami L. Rev. 29; J. Resnick, supra note 146; C. Tobias, "Keeping the 
Covenant on the Federal Courts" ( 1994) S.M.U.L. Rev. 1 86 1 ;  C. Tobias, "Increasing Balance 
in the Federal Bench" (1995) 32 Houston L. Rev. 1 37. 
172. Minow, "Stripped", supra note l49 at 1214.  
173. P. Wald. ''1be Role of Morality in Judging: A Woman Judge's Perspective" ( 1986) 4 
Law & Inequality 3. 
l 74. Gotanda, supra note 156 at 53, 60. I wonder what Sparks J. • s response will be. It is worth 
noting that in rendering her decision against disclosure of the tapes (a decision which was prior 
to the Crown filing a notice of appeal) Sparks J . was clear as to the appropriateness of her 
decision in favour of acquittal. 
Tangentially, I point out here the courts have historically been critical of state agencies, 
including police departments. Courts have also, I would suggest, been protective of 
rights of all accused persons: rich or poor, Black or White. There have been, and will 
continue to be, cases where courts will be critical of the Halifax Police Department and 
its treatment of visible minorities as a group, a group which has historically been 
subjected to discriminatory treatment in Nova Scotian society. Many would forcefully 
arg1te that the judicial branch of government is the appropriate venue in which the 
actions of police and other state agencies shall be subject to critical scrutiny . . .  There 
have been, and no doubt will continue to be, cases where the courts, rightfully in my 
view, examine and criticize when necessary the investigation of a police officer, and 
equally so, if not more so, when the investigation is of a person from a group which has 
historically endured discriminatory treatment in the justice system. There is no need to 
/ 
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that while modest efforts may be made to diversify the judiciary, the 
bottom line is that Black female judges should be seen, but not heard. 175 
IX. Conclusion 
The pursuit of a more inclusive and diversified judiciary requires a great 
deal more than a marginal increase in the number of hitherto 
underrepresented groups. Among other things, it requires a recognition 
that principles and rules of law are themselves historically, culturally and 
socially contingent and therefore in need of reconsideration and possible 
reconfiguration. 
The common law principle against judicial bias serves two connected, 
but discrete functions. On an individual level, the principle ensures that 
parties receive a fair trial. On a collective level, the principle promotes 
public confidence in the judiciary and therefore reinforces the integrity of 
the legal system. 176 But fairness and faith should not be conceptualized as 
formalistic abstractions. 177 They can only be efficacious when located in 
the context of contemporary Canadian society. In this comment I have 
identified an extensive literature which indisputably confirms that there 
are significant problems in police-Black interactions. A contextualized 
approach to fairness cannot afford to ignore these realities, particularly if 
we believe in innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Similarly, there is a widespread perception in Canadian society that the 
legal system does in fact discriminate against members of "non-white" 
communities. Thus, rather than promoting faith in the integrity of the 
cite cases, however, suffice it to say this is one of the fundamental and necessary 
functions of the judicial branch of government and a cornerstone of judicial indepen­
dence. For an exhaustive review of treatment of people of colour in the judicial system 
see: The Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall.Jr. Prosecution, Province of Nova 
Scotia, December 1989, volumes 3 and 4, in particular. 
R.D.S. #2, supra note 1 8  at 16- 1 7. 
1 75. There is, of course, a different vision: 
In a society of diverse interests and competing values, impartiality is increasingly 
understood not as a reflection of the status quo, but as a capacity to be genuinely open 
to the pluralistic views and people Canada represents. No longer are the traditional 
judicial attributes of knowledge, common sense, civility, and experience sufficient. 
Judicial decision-making is not the mechanical application oflaw and the precedent to 
sets of facts. The legitimacy of the judges, and their effectiveness in playing the complex 
tasks we have assigned them, depend on the openness and fairness of their selection, and 
on their sensitivity to the society which they serve and from which they come. 
Appointing Judges. supra note 4 at I .  
176. Valente v. The Queen (1985), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at 204 (S.C.C.). 
177. R. v. lippe, I 1991) 2 S.C.R. 1 14 at 140-41; R. v. McAvena, ( 1987] 4 W.W.R. 15 (Sask. 
C.A.), Bayda C.J. 
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legal system, G lube CJ.' s decision can only do the opposite, 178 especially 
when it is set in contrast to the "complete exoneration" of Judge 
Bourassa 179 and the findings of "impartiality" on the part of the Reference 
Court in the Donald Marshall Jr. case. 180 
X. Addendum 
While this comment was going to press, R.D.S. appealed the decision of 
Glube C.J. By a majority the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal rejected the 
appeal and upheld the ruling that there should be a new trial in front of a 
different judge. 181  
The appellant advanced three arguments: first, that Glube C.J. inter­
fered with a determination of credibility by a trial court judge; second, 
that Glube C.J. relied upon an inappropriate standard in articulating and 
applying the reasonable apprehension of bias test; and third, that in 
interpreting the reasonable apprehension of bias test Glube CJ. adopted 
a formal equality approach rather than a substantive equality approach as 
mandated by ss. 15, l l (d) and 7 of the Charter. The majority decision, 
written by Flinn J.A. and concurred in by Pugsley J.A., rejected all three 
arguments. The dissent, written by Freeman J.A., seems to accept an 
amalgam of the first two arguments, and does not explicitly address the 
third argument, although it seems to adopt a more contextual approach. 
The decisions reflect many of the themes .previously identified in this 
comment: inclusion and exclusion; realism and formalism; colour 
contextualism and colourblindness; perspectivism and impartiality; and 
comity and intolerance. 
Flinn J .A. rapidly disposed of the credibility and Cha.rt er arguments. 
With regard to credibility he simply asserted that Glube C.J.'s decision 
"was not based upon a re-examinatio� and determination, of issues of 
credibility". 182 In relation to the Charter argument, he avoided any 
1 78. It might also be noted that Judge Sparks' situation may not be as unique as it seems. In 
recent years, several Canadian women arbitrators have been challenged (sometimes success­
fully) on the basis of gender bias. At this point, I would venture to conjecture that what we may 
be witnessing is an emerging pattern whereby women who are beginning to "make it" in the 
higher echelons of legal bureaucracies are constructed as presumptively partisan, unlike the 
generations of men who have been assumed to be neutral . For an overview of some of these 
situations see Omatsu, supra note 4 at 144. See also S. Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War 
Against American Women (New York: Anchor, 1992). 
179. Supra note 87. 
180. Supra note at 232. It should be remembered that a research study commissioned by the 
Marshall Inquiry found that respondents were more concerned about the conduct of the courts 
than the police! (Marshall Report, supra note I at vol. IV, 1 8, 27.) 
1 8 1 .  R.D.S. v. R. (25 October 1995) C.A.C. # 1 1 7036 (N.S.C.A.). 
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engaged discussion on the basis that it had not been raised at the lower 
level. In spite of this, he opined that Glube C.J. "did not, in [his] view 
apply an inappropriate equality approach in her consideration of appre­
hension of bias."183 In my opinion this suggests a strategy of confession 
and avoidance. Flinn J.A. appears to be . saying that he favours a 
decontextualized, formalistic and sameness approach to the equality 
provisions, but then says that it is unnecessary to pursue this because it is 
a non-issue. However, he seems to be missing the point. Clearly, the 
Charter angle could not have been raised at the trial level because bias 
was not an issue. While he is technically correct to suggest that the 
Charter analysis could have been raised in argument before Glube C.J., 
the point is that it was her reasons for decision that generated the 
appellant's equality concerns. Moreover, other upper level courts have 
exercised their discretion to alJow Charter arguments to be·raised for the 
first time at the appeal level. 184 
However, as I have said, Flinn J.A. gave short shrift to the Charter 
argument and focussed the bulk of his decision on the test for detennining 
whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. Having invoked 
several of the usual precedents and broad dicta from administrative law 
scholars, 185 Flinn J .A. identified five "essential ingredients of the test to 
determine apprehension of bias." Only one of these is controversial, that 
is, his suggestion that "there is no essential difference between the 
phrases . . .  ' reasonable apprehension of bias', 'reasonable suspicion of 
bias,' or 'real likelihood of bias'. "186 While it is true that some courts have 
attempted to elide the differences, as I have pointed out in Part III, many 
other courts (including the House of Lords) have found that there are 
significant differences. Persuasive legal reasoning would, in my opinion, 
explicitly confront these competing lines of authority and attempt to 
come to some resolution on the basis of either principle or policy. 
Unfortunately, this is not the path chosen by Flinn J.A., although he does 
add that "[s]urmise or conjecture is not sufficient; nor is the test related 
to the very sensitive or scrupulous conscience". 187 For him, quite simply, 
it is a reasonableness test. Thus, when Flinn J .A. applied the test, he too 
found that Judge Sparks's comments indicated that she was considering 
"matters not in evidence" in detennining credibility, that her ''unfortunate 
use of . . .  generalizations" denied the police officer any opportunity to 
183. Ibid. at 14. 
184. See e.l(., R.W.D.S.U. loca/ 580 et al. v. Dolphin Delivery ltd., ( 1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. 
185. Supra note 181 al 6-10. 
186. Ibid. at 11. 
187. /hid. 
' , ·  ) 
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address such concerns, and that he was therefore treated "unfairly." 1R8 
Consequently, once again, and even more explicitly than in the decision 
of Glube C.J ., we encounter the process of constructing the White police 
officer as the victim of an inequitable Black judge. 
Finally, it should be noted that at one point the majority decision does 
acknowledge the argument that police officers may manifest bias against 
Black youth, but Flinn J.A. counters that while "[t]hat may very well be 
so . . .  it does not address the real issue here". 189 Yet again the inter-racial 
dynamic that underlies this case is repressed. 
In stark contrast the dissenting decision of Freeman J .A. opens as 
follows: 
The essential issue in this appeal is whether a trial judge gave rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias.in remarks made in the case of a fifteen 
year old black youth apprehended by a white police officer on charges of 
assaulting him . . . .  190 
Moreover, a few pages later he continues: 
[t]he case was racially charged, a classic confrontation between a white 
police officer representing the power of the state and a black youth charged 
with an offence . . .  It is unfortunately true and within the scope of general 
knowledge of any individual that police officers have been known to 
mislead the court and overreact in dealing with non-white groups. 19 1 
There is no attempt by Freeman J .A. to bury the race issue under layers 
of precedent. Rather he quickly agrees with majority's articulation of the 
relevant law, but disagrees with the way in which they applied the test: 
"it was perfectly proper for the trial judge, in weighing the evidence 
before her, to consider the racial perspective."192 For Freeman J.A., the 
case is at bottom about when an appeal court may review a trial judge's 
determination of credibility and on what basis? In contrast to the majority 
decision which avoided the credibility issue and focussed on the objective 
reasonable person, Freeman J.A. acknowledges the inevitable subjectiv­
ity of determining credibility. He advocates that like any other judge, 
"Judge Sparks was under a duty to be sensitive to the nuances and 
implications, and to rely on her own common sense which is necessarily 
informed by her own experience and understanding." 193 Here there is no 
attempt to force a judge to deny her identity and experience; rather there 
is an awareness that diversity of perspective is an attribute not a liability. 
1 88. Ibid. at 1 3-14. 
1 89. Ibid. at 1 3. 
190. Ibid. at 1 5 .  
19 1 .  Ibid. at  1 8. 
192. Ibid. at 16. 
193. Ibid. at 1 8. 
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But Freeman J.A. is careful not to allow a tolerance for perspectivisn 
to become a licence for ad hocery. He is clear that determinations o: 
credibility need to be supported by evidence and if they are not, they ma) 
be reviewed by a superior court. However, as he reads Sparks J. 's reasons 
Freeman J .A. believes that she has provided sufficient grounds to suppo11 
her concern that the police officer may have overreacted, "enough tc 
justify her in tipping the scales in an assessment of credibility." 194 
On this basis, Freeman J.A. then returns to the test of a reasonablf 
apprehension of bias. Again he reiterates the context: 
Questions with racial overtones make the difficulties [of assessing cred­
ibility] more intense, yet these questions must be addressed freely and 
frankly and to the best of the judge's ability. Because of their explosive 
nature they are more likely than any others to subject the judge to 
controversy and allegations of bias, but they cannot be ignored if justice 
is to be done. 195 
Because he is astute in recognizing that emotions can overflow in these 
situations, he counsels caution and restraint (and perhaps even solidarity) 
emphasizing that the standard for finding a reasonable apprehension of 
bias is "high . . .  it must be real". 196 Thus for Freeman, J.A. the comments 
of Judge Sparks "would not cause a reasonable and informed person to be 
apprehensive that justice was not being done. "197 And, unsurprisingly, the 
views of this hypothetical reasonable person dovetail very closely with 
Freeman J.A.'s own opinion that Judge Sparks's remarks are "more 
consistent with a fair inquiry into delicate subject matter than suggestive 
of bias on her own part. " 198 
Meanwhile, on the other side of town, R.D.S. prepared for the retrial 
which was scheduled for five days later. This has now been adjourned 
pending a leave to appeal application to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
194. Ibid. at 20. 
195. Ibid. at 20. 
1 96. Ibid. 
197. lbid. at 2 1 .  
198. Ibid. at 20-2 I .  
